FOLK v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, 2:10-cv-07377

Folk, an African-American woman, worked for the DOE on a reduced schedule due to depression, anxiety, and stress; she was required to call in on days she would be absent and eventually stopped reporting to work, leading to termination on September 16, 2010.
Folk filed a three-count complaint alleging discrimination, retaliation, and FMLA violations; the court assumed Title VI/ VII discrimination and FMLA claims, and denied leave to amend for a state-law retaliation claim.
Key events include: (a) multiple pre-2008 job assignments and performance reviews; (b) December 2009 EEOC complaint; (c) 2010 FMLA leave approval with an error allowing two days per week, later corrected; (d) call-off violations and warnings; (e) discharge in September 2010.
The court held that the FMLA self-care provision is not cognizable against the DOE due to Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md. holding abrogation invalid; the DOE is immune under the FMLA claims.
Title VI and Title VII claims were analyzed under McDonnell Douglas framework; the court found no similarly situated non-minority comparators, rejected retaliation due to lack of causation, and granted summary judgment for the DOE on all counts; it also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law retaliation and denied Folk’s motion to amend.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
FMLA self-care claim immunity	Folk argues DOE violated FMLA by denying leave.	DOE immune under Coleman abrogation issue.	FMLA claims dismissed; DOE immune.
Title VI discrimination viability	Folk asserts race-based discrimination under Title VI.	DOE shows no federal funding link; no fact issue.	Title VI claim granted summary judgment for DOE.
Title VII discrimination prima facie	Folk was treated less favorably due to race; similarly situated comparator shown.	Plaintiff failed to establish a valid comparator; no prima facie case.	Summary judgment for DOE on discrimination.
Title VII retaliation causation	Folk’s EEOC activity caused adverse actions.	Adverse actions occurred before/long after protected activity; no causal link.	Summary judgment for DOE on retaliation.
Leave to amend / supplemental jurisdiction	State-law retaliation claim should be allowed.	Court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction; amendment not permitted.	Motion to amend denied; supplemental jurisdiction declined.

Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012) (abrogation of FMLA self-care provision invalid)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (prima facie case and burden-shifting framework)
Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994) (pretext evidence standard in retaliation/discrimination cases)
Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331 (3d Cir. 2006) (causation and adverse action in retaliation claims)
Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751 (3d Cir. 2004) (causation timing in retaliation claims)
Opsatnik v. Norfolk S. Corp., 335 F. App’x 220 (3d Cir. 2009) (similarly situated requirement for discrimination)
Robinson v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 982 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1993) (causation in retaliation where sequence of events matters)