257 So. 3d 1134
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2018Background
- David and Jennifer Foley operated a commercial toucan business from their home in Orange County; code enforcement found zoning violations and the BZA and BCC affirmed enforcement.
- The Foleys sued in federal court raising federal and state claims; the district court granted summary judgment to the County on federal claims but to the Foleys on state claims.
- The Eleventh Circuit reversed in part, holding the federal claims were frivolous and the district court lacked federal-question jurisdiction over the case; the district court dismissed on remand.
- Within 30 days of the federal dismissal, the Foleys filed suit in Florida state court asserting the state-law claims; defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the state statute of limitations barred the action.
- The state trial court dismissed, holding §1367(d) did not toll limitations because the federal court lacked original jurisdiction; the Foleys appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 28 U.S.C. §1367(d) tolled the limitations period for state claims after federal dismissal for lack of jurisdiction | §1367(d) tolled the limitations period while the federal claims were pending and for 30 days after dismissal, so the state filing was timely | §1367(d) does not apply because the federal court never had original jurisdiction (Eleventh Circuit found federal claims frivolous) | Reversed: §1367(d) applies; tolling is available even when dismissal is for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, so the Foleys filed within the tolled 30-day period |
| Whether Krause is distinguishable because the federal claims here were frivolous | Krause controls; tolling does not require a successful or plausible federal claim | Tolling should be limited where federal claims were frivolous or lacked any plausible basis | Rejected: Court follows Krause — reason for dismissal (including frivolousness) does not negate §1367(d) tolling |
| Whether appellate court should affirm on alternative "tipsy coachman" grounds (defendants' immunity) | Plaintiffs argued only timeliness on appeal; did not fully litigate immunity on remand | Defendants urged affirmance because they are immune from suit | Majority declined to affirm on tipsy coachman grounds because the trial court made no factual findings on immunity; remanded for further proceedings |
| Whether Ovadia controls to deny tolling | Plaintiffs distinguish Ovadia; argue subsequent authority and Krause permit tolling | Defendants relied on Ovadia to argue §1367(d) inapplicable when federal court lacked jurisdiction | Court rejects Ovadia as inconsistent with Krause and later decisions; §1367(d) applies |
Key Cases Cited
- Krause v. Textron Financial Corp., 59 So. 3d 1085 (Fla. 2011) (Florida Supreme Court holds §1367(d) tolling applies even when federal court dismisses for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction)
- Scarfo v. Ginsberg, 817 So. 2d 919 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (applies §1367(d) tolling where federal case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; purpose is to protect state claims pursued in federal court)
- Blinn v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 781 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (tolling under §1367(d) applies despite dismissal of federal action; tolling not limited to discretionary declinations)
- Ovadia v. Bloom, 756 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (earlier DCA decision denying §1367(d) tolling where federal court never had diversity jurisdiction)
- Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala. v. Sanders, 138 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 1998) (discussed in Eleventh Circuit's analysis of frivolous federal claims and federal-question jurisdiction)