369 F. Supp. 3d 617
E.D. Pa.2019Background
- Plaintiff Lisa Folajtar pled guilty in 2011 to a federal felony for filing a false tax return (26 U.S.C. § 7206(1)); she received probation (including 3 months home confinement) and a fine, and completed probation without violations.
- Because of that felony conviction, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) bars her from possessing, purchasing, or receiving firearms or ammunition, and from obtaining a Federal Firearms License for her business.
- Folajtar filed an as-applied Second Amendment challenge seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing her non‑violent felony is distinguishable from those historically barred.
- The Government moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing Congress reasonably classified her conviction as a felony and the prohibition is presumptively lawful.
- The District Court applied the Third Circuit’s Marzzarella/Binderup two-step framework for as-applied challenges and concluded Folajtar failed at step one to distinguish her conviction from the historically barred class.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 922(g)(1) as applied to Folajtar burdens her Second Amendment right | Folajtar: her nonviolent false-tax-return felony is not the sort of "serious crime" that historically justified disarmament | Government: Congress labeled it a felony; presumptively lawful to disarm those convicted of crimes punishable by >1 year | Court: § 922(g)(1) applies and presumptively burdens the right; plaintiff must rebut at step one but fails |
| Whether Folajtar can meet Marzzarella step one (distinguish herself from historically barred felons) | Folajtar: nature of offense, statutory maximum, actual sentence, and cross-jurisdictional views show it is not a "serious crime" | Government: felony label, statutory maximum, and legislative judgment support treating it as serious | Court: factors weigh in favor of treating the federal felony as a serious crime; plaintiff fails step one |
| Whether the court must reach Marzzarella step two (intermediate scrutiny) | Folajtar: if she clears step one, Government must justify disarmament under intermediate scrutiny | Government: would show risk- and interest‑based reasons to disarm if reached | Court: did not reach step two because plaintiff failed step one |
| Whether dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate | Folajtar: alleged facts plausibly show an as-applied constitutional claim | Government: complaint lacks the strong factual showing required by Binderup/Marzzarella | Court: granted Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal; complaint not plausible under required framework |
Key Cases Cited
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (Second Amendment protects lawful self-defense but preserves longstanding prohibitions, incl. felon disarmament)
- McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (incorporation of Second Amendment rights and reiteration that Heller left longstanding prohibitions intact)
- Binderup v. Attorney General, 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. en banc 2016) (articulates as-applied framework and burden-shifting from Marzzarella; challenger must strongly rebut presumption for serious crimes)
- United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010) (two-step framework for assessing as-applied Second Amendment challenges)
- United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2011) (guides Marzzarella-based analysis and treats serious crimes as forfeiting firearm rights)