Flythe v. District of Columbia
Civil Action No. 2010-2021
D.D.C.Aug 26, 2016Background
- On Dec. 26, 2009, MPD Officers Angel Vazquez and Travis Eagan encountered Tremayne Flythe after a liquor-store report; Vazquez shot at Flythe during an initial encounter and later radioed that Flythe had a knife.
- Eagan located Flythe running with a dog, ordered him to get on the ground, and then shot Flythe; Flythe died; a knife was recovered near the body but several eyewitnesses testified they did not see a knife during the Vazquez encounter and some described Eagan chasing and shooting while Flythe ran.
- Plaintiff Betty Flythe sued under §1983 (excessive force) and for assault and battery against both officers and the District (vicarious liability). The district court granted summary judgment for Eagan (qualified immunity) but allowed claims against Vazquez and the District to proceed; the jury found the District liable for assault and battery based on both officers’ conduct.
- The D.C. Circuit affirmed the jury verdict but reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Eagan, holding that genuine disputes of fact remained about whether Flythe threatened Eagan with a knife and instructing careful review of circumstantial evidence when the officer is the sole surviving witness.
- On remand, Eagan moved again for summary judgment (including as to punitive damages); the district court denied both motions, holding (1) it is bound by the D.C. Circuit’s reversal, (2) disputed material facts remain about what happened when Flythe turned toward Eagan, and (3) punitive damages cannot be decided as a matter of law given the contested facts.
- The court also held the District is no longer a party because the earlier jury resolved the District’s vicarious liability and the judgment has been satisfied; compensatory damages were fully determined in the first trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Eagan is entitled to summary judgment on §1983/excessive force/common-law privilege | Flythe: disputed facts (eyewitness accounts, lack of visible knife, circumstantial evidence) preclude summary judgment; jury must decide credibility | Eagan: trial record supports his version (Flythe brandished a knife and advanced) and warrants summary judgment/qualified immunity | Denied — court bound by D.C. Circuit reversal and finds genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Flythe threatened Eagan with a knife |
| Whether punitive damages should be dismissed as a matter of law | Flythe: evidence (circumstances, possible drug use by Eagan, disputed facts) supports submitting punitive damages to jury | Eagan: no evidence of malice, conduct not outrageous; punitive damages inappropriate | Denied — factual disputes (including circumstantial evidence and drug-test history) preclude ruling out punitive damages |
| Whether the District remains a defendant / relitigation of District liability | Flythe: earlier trial form and instructions were improper but did not preserve challenge; damages instructions covered survival and wrongful-death claims | District: prior jury found District vicariously liable and satisfaction of judgment renders it non-party | Held: District is no longer a party — prior jury verdict resolved District’s vicarious liability and judgment has been satisfied |
| Whether prior compensatory award bars additional compensatory recovery from Eagan | Flythe: prior proceedings were flawed but she cannot recover duplicative compensation | Eagan: prior joint award and verdict foreclose further compensatory damages against him | Held: Compensatory damages were fully determined in first trial; plaintiff cannot recover additional compensatory damages, but Eagan’s individual liability (and punitive damages) remain to be decided |
Key Cases Cited
- Flythe v. District of Columbia, 791 F.3d 13 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (reversed summary judgment for officer; emphasized careful review of circumstantial evidence when officer is sole surviving witness)
- Flythe v. District of Columbia, 994 F. Supp. 2d 50 (D.D.C. 2013) (district court initially granted summary judgment to Eagan on qualified immunity and common-law privilege)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (Fourth Amendment excessive-force standard is objective reasonableness)
- Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (deadly force to prevent escape permissible only if suspect poses threat of serious physical harm)
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (qualified-immunity framework; use-of-force boundary articulation)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (summary-judgment standard: genuine dispute for trial requires sufficient evidence)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (movant’s burden on summary judgment; shifting burdens)
- Scott v. Henrich, 39 F.3d 912 (9th Cir. 1994) (courts should not accept potentially self-serving police accounts without examining consistency with other evidence)