Floyd v. City of New York
283 F.R.D. 153
S.D.N.Y.2012Background
- NYC police stop-and-frisk program is centralized and department-wide, with policy control at high levels.
- Between 2004-2009, about 2.8 million stops documented; data show racial disparities (Black and Latino stops) versus Whites.
- Plaintiffs allege Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations and seek class-wide injunctive relief and declarations against NYPD policies.
- I granted class certification for a Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive-relief class covering stops and frisks conducted without reasonable suspicion, including race-based stops.
- Evidence includes centralized training, audits (UF-250 forms), CompStat reviews, and roll-call recordings indicating production standards/quotas.
- Defendants concede centralized policies exist, but dispute the existence/impact of quotas; the court nonetheless finds a centralized causal policy.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the class meets Rule 23(a) prerequisites | Floyd shows common policy; substantial evidence of centralized practice. | Class description too indefinite and individual stops vary widely. | Yes; prerequisites satisfied for Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(2). |
| Whether Rule 23(b)(2) certification is proper for injunctive relief | Injunctive relief is appropriate to remedy centralized constitutional violations. | Injunctive relief may be ineffective or intrudes on governance without a precise policy. | Proper under Rule 23(b)(2). |
| Whether Galvan doctrine bars class certification due to anticipated universal relief | Galvan does not apply; certification aids implementation of relief across class. | Galvan prevents certification if relief would render class-specific relief unnecessary. | Inapplicable; certification allowed to implement nationwide injunction. |
| Standing to seek injunctive relief | Ourlicht has standing due to repeated past instances and ongoing risk; others may too. | Only past injury matters; risk should be speculative for some plaintiffs. | Ourlicht's standing suffices to sustain standing; analysis extends to class. |
Key Cases Cited
- Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (reaffirms Rule 23(a)/(b)(2) standards for class actions; commonality/typicality considerations)
- Daniels v. City of New York, 198 F.R.D. 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (ascertainability and certification in NYPD stop-and-frisk context (Handschu lineage))
- Handschu v. Special Services Div., No official reporter cited here (1979) (foundational class-action/ascertainability framework in NYPD surveillance context)
- Marisol A. v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372 (2d Cir. 1997) (unitary policy approach supports class treatment for centralized system-wide claims)
- In re Initial Public Offerings Sec. Litig. (IPO), 471 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2006) (reaffirmed rigorous pre-certification analysis; relevance to Rule 23 balance)
- Galvan v. Levine, 490 F.2d 1255 (2d Cir. 1973) (doctrine discussed regarding avoidance of class certification when relief would be uniform)
- McLaughlin v. American Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2008) (contextual guidance on commonality/typicality in complex class actions)