Flowers v. Mississippi
139 S. Ct. 2228
SCOTUS2019Background
- Curtis Flowers (Black) was tried six times for a 1996 quadruple murder in Winona, Mississippi; the same white prosecutor led all six prosecutions.
- Earlier trials produced convictions reversed for prosecutorial misconduct or ended in mistrials; state courts in earlier proceedings found at least some prosecutorial misconduct and in one trial found Batson violations or strong prima facie evidence.
- Across the six trials, the State struck an overwhelming share of Black prospective jurors (the Court notes 41 of 42 available Black panelists were struck across trials).
- At the sixth trial (the case here), the venire included 6 Black and 20 white prospective jurors; the State used 6 peremptories and struck 5 of the 6 Black panelists, leaving a jury of 11 white and 1 Black juror.
- Flowers raised a Batson challenge; the trial court accepted race-neutral reasons, and the Mississippi Supreme Court (divided) affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed, finding the totality of circumstances established discriminatory intent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Flowers) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the State violated Batson by using peremptory strikes to exclude Black veniremembers at the sixth trial | The prosecutor’s pattern across trials, striking 5 of 6 Blacks at the sixth trial, disparate voir dire (145 questions to struck Black jurors vs 12 to seated white jurors), inaccurate and pretextual explanations (e.g., for Carolyn Wright), and historical pattern show strikes were race-motivated | The strikes were supported by race-neutral reasons (ties to defense witnesses/family, past lawsuits, views on death penalty, demeanor); disparate questioning reflected legitimate follow-up to issues raised | Reversed: considering the totality of historical pattern, the six-trial record, disparate voir dire treatment, and side-by-side comparisons (especially Carolyn Wright), the trial court clearly erred; Batson violation established |
| Proper role and deference of trial and appellate courts in Batson review | Trial-court credibility findings must weigh all relevant circumstances, including history and disparate questioning; reversal appropriate where combined facts show pretext | State emphasized deference to trial and state supreme court findings and argued individual reasons were facially race-neutral | The Court reiterated Batson standards: trial-court credibility is central but review here on direct appeal required assessing the full record; the combined circumstances warranted reversal |
| Relevant evidence to consider under Batson (scope of permissible evidence) | Historical patterns of strikes in prior trials, statistics, disparate questioning, side-by-side comparisons, and misstatements can be considered to infer discriminatory intent | Some historical facts and voir dire differences do not prove discrimination; individual, facially neutral reasons suffice absent clear pretext | Held that Batson allows consideration of historical use of strikes, disparate voir dire, statistics, side-by-side comparisons, and misstatements as part of the totality of circumstances |
| Whether a single struck juror (Carolyn Wright) required reversal given the broader context | Even one discriminatory strike is unconstitutional; Wright’s strike, when viewed with history and disparate treatment, was motivated in substantial part by race | The State’s reasons for Wright (ties to witnesses/family, prior lawsuit) were race-neutral and credible; prior trials’ strikes were largely race-neutral | Held that the strike of Wright, in context, was pretextual and motivated substantially by discriminatory intent; reversal required |
Key Cases Cited
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (prosecutors may not use peremptory challenges to exclude jurors based on race; burden-shifting Batson framework)
- Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. (2016) (per curiam and substantive application reaffirming that misstatements and historical evidence may show pretext under Batson)
- Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (disparate questioning, statistics, and comparisons can support inference of discriminatory intent)
- Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (trial-court credibility and demeanor findings are central in Batson inquiries; appellate review limited)
- Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (defendant of any race may object to race-based juror exclusions; standing principles in Batson context)
- Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (prior rule requiring systemic proof over many cases; largely superseded by Batson)
- Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (Fourteenth Amendment prohibits statutory exclusion of jurors by race; historical foundation for juror equality)