317 So.3d 1101
Fla.2021Background
- In 2016 Florida voters adopted Article X, §29 (the Amendment) directing the Department of Health (Department) to promulgate regulations to ensure availability and safe use of medical marijuana and to register medical marijuana treatment centers (MMTCs).
- In 2017 the Legislature amended §381.986 to implement the Amendment (Senate Bill 8-A), creating a licensure/registration scheme that (a) initially grandfathered prior "dispensing organizations," (b) capped initial license numbers and phased expansion tied to patient counts, and (c) required vertically integrated MMTCs that cultivate, process, transport, and dispense (with limited contracting exceptions).
- Florigrown sued the Department challenging (1) the vertical-integration requirement as conflicting with the Amendment’s MMTC definition, (2) statutory caps on number of MMTC licenses as defeating the Amendment’s availability mandate, and (3) certain grandfathering provisions as unconstitutional special laws granting private corporate privileges.
- The trial court granted a temporary injunction broadly prohibiting enforcement of parts of §381.986(8); the First District partially upheld that injunction and certified a question of great public importance concerning conflict between the statute and the Amendment.
- The Florida Supreme Court quashed the First District: it held Florigrown failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits for any constitutional claim—finding no conflict between the Amendment and vertical integration, insufficient evidence the caps made marijuana unavailable, and that the challenged provisions are part of a general statewide regulatory scheme rather than invalid special laws.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §381.986(8)(e) (vertical integration) conflicts with the Amendment’s definition of MMTC | Florigrown: Amendment’s disjunctive definition of MMTC implies an entity performing any listed function can be registered; statute unlawfully forces vertical integration | Department: Amendment contemplates Department regulations and Legislature may enact consistent laws; statute sets licensure standards, not a conflicting definition | Held: No conflict. Amendment contemplates regulatory standards and registration by the Department; statute imposes licensure requirements and may require vertical integration. |
| Whether statutory caps on number of MMTC licenses conflict with Amendment’s availability/safety mandate | Florigrown: Caps unreasonably restrict supply, making medical marijuana insufficiently available and defeating Amendment’s purpose | Department: Caps are part of a phased regulatory scheme with planned expansion tied to patient counts; evidence does not show unavailability | Held: No substantial likelihood of success. Record lacks competent evidence that caps made medical marijuana unavailable; statute permits expansion and does not bar sufficient access. |
| Whether §381.986(8)(a)1., 2.a., 3. are invalid special laws granting privileges to private corporations (Art. III, §11(a)(12)) | Florigrown: Grandfathering and preferences operate on closed classes that receive licenses without competition—an unconstitutional privilege | Department: These provisions are components of a statewide, generally applicable regulatory scheme and create open classes over time; classifications are reasonably related to purpose | Held: No substantial likelihood of success. Court treats provisions as part of a general law implementing a statewide scheme; classifications are reasonably related and the class is not impermissibly closed for constitutional purposes. |
| Entitlement to temporary injunction (likelihood of success element) | Florigrown: Demonstrated substantial likelihood on merits, irreparable harm, and public interest supporting injunction | Department: Florigrown failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits (fatal to injunction) | Held: Because Florigrown failed to show substantial likelihood of success on any constitutional claim, the temporary injunction should have been denied; First DCA decision quashed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Provident Mgmt. Corp. v. City of Treasure Island, 796 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 2001) (elements and extraordinary nature of a temporary injunction)
- Reform Party of Fla. v. Black, 885 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 2004) (temporary injunction elements)
- Gainesville Woman Care, LLC v. State, 210 So. 3d 1243 (Fla. 2017) (standard of review for injunctions and deference to trial court on factual findings)
- In re Advisory Opinion to Attorney General re Use of Marijuana for Debilitating Medical Conditions, 181 So. 3d 471 (Fla. 2015) (interpretation of Amendment language regarding registration/licensure)
- Dep’t of Legal Affairs v. Sanford-Orlando Kennel Club, 434 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 1983) (open vs. closed classifications and when a law is special or general)
- St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Deseret Ranches of Fla., Inc., 421 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 1982) (treating a provision limited in direct application as part of a statewide general law)
- Schrader v. Fla. Keys Aqueduct Auth., 840 So. 2d 1050 (Fla. 2003) (geographic/closed classifications can be upheld when tied to statewide natural-resource purposes)