Flor v. Flor, AC 16-P-752

Parties divorced in 2008; their separation agreement (merged into the judgment) waived past/present alimony but reserved the wife's right to seek future alimony; husband paid child support until the child's emancipation (no later than age 23).
Child born Jan 2, 1993; she left college and effectively became emancipated by January 2, 2016.
Wife (56 at trial) had been out of the workforce for many years, with minimal recent work and some emotional history; judge attributed to her earnings equivalent to a full-time minimum-wage job.
Husband (59 at trial) was primary earner during marriage; judge found husband’s financial position superior and able to pay spousal support.
Wife filed a complaint for modification (and initially for alimony) in 2015 as child’s twenty-third birthday approached; summary judgment dismissed the standalone alimony complaint but allowed the modification claim to proceed.
Trial judge found the child’s impending emancipation and the parties’ changed finances constituted a material change permitting modification and ordered $145/week general term alimony indefinitely (amended to terminate on remarriage or death).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Wife)	Defendant's Argument (Husband)	Held
Whether child’s emancipation and attendant changes permit modification to award general term alimony	Emancipation and changed incomes/expenses constitute a material change post-judgment permitting alimony	Any change was caused by wife’s voluntary failure to work; loss of child support was foreseeable and cannot be a material change	Court affirmed: judge reasonably found material change based on comparative income/expenses and attributed income; refusal to impute all lost earnings was not error
Whether G. L. c. 208, § 49(f) (Alimony Reform Act presumption that general term alimony terminates at payor’s retirement) applies to an alimony award entered in 2016	Wife: award is a modification of the 2008 judgment (reserved in agreement), so pre-act modification standards govern	Husband: award is an initial post-act alimony order and § 49(f) should control, creating a termination presumption at retirement	Court affirmed: treating the claim as a modification of the 2008 judgment (agreement explicitly addressed future alimony) means § 49(f) does not apply; Chin/precedent prohibit retroactive application of the Act

Pierce v. Pierce, 455 Mass. 286 (appellate standard for review of modification)
Chin v. Merriot, 470 Mass. 527 (2015) (rules governing modification for judgments entered before Alimony Reform Act; no retroactive application)
Buckley v. Buckley, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 716 (1997) (reservation in separation agreement treats later claim as modification of original divorce judgment)
Downey v. Downey, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 812 (2002) (general reservation to revisit alimony contemplates changed circumstances at emancipation)
Snow v. Snow, 476 Mass. 425 (2017) (distinguishes claims that are initial alimony requests from claims that are modifications)
Pagar v. Pagar, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 1 (1980) (party may not deliberately waste assets or ignore feasible income sources; court explained limits)