2019 IL App (1st) 172792
Ill. App. Ct.2019Background
- Pastor Eric Flood petitioned for a civil stalking no-contact order under the Stalking No Contact Order Act after respondent Chester Wilk repeatedly sent letters, distributed fliers, entered church offices, and otherwise targeted Flood and South Park Church over a decade.
- Petitioner alleged repeated unwanted contacts (visits, letters, fliers, emails, and placement of materials on parishioners’ cars) beginning in 2006 and escalating in 2017; he testified these acts caused anxiety, disruption, and fear for congregation safety.
- The trial court found Wilk engaged in stalking, entered a plenary order prohibiting contact and establishing distance restrictions, and included paragraph (b)(5) banning Wilk from “communicating, publishing or communicating in any form any writing naming or regarding [petitioner], his family, or any employee, staff or member of the congregation of South Park Church.”
- Wilk did not contest the stalking finding on appeal; he challenged only paragraph (b)(5) as an unconstitutional prior restraint on free speech.
- The appellate court reviewed whether the injunction’s broad ban on written communications about the church or its members impermissibly restricted protected speech and vacated paragraph (b)(5) as overly broad and content-based.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether paragraph (b)(5)’s ban on writings about Flood, his family, church staff, or congregants violates free speech | Flood argued the injunction was necessary to protect petitioner and congregation from a course of conduct that caused emotional distress and fear | Wilk argued the provision is a prior restraint and content-based, prohibiting constitutionally protected speech (criticism, opinion, publication) | Court vacated paragraph (b)(5): it is a content-based, overbroad prior restraint that prohibits protected speech and fails strict scrutiny |
| Whether Wilk’s writings constituted unprotected speech (threats, true threats, or integral to unlawful conduct) | Flood emphasized persistence, escalation, and that writings caused fear—suggesting speech tied to stalking thus unprotected | Wilk maintained his letters and publications were opinion/criticism and not threats of violence | Court: No express finding that writings were true threats or integral to another separate crime; some conduct could be unprotected, but the blanket ban swept in protected speech and was not narrowly tailored |
| Whether the Act or the injunction may lawfully restrict communications “to or about” a person that cause emotional distress | Flood relied on the Act’s definition of stalking (which includes communications causing emotional distress) | Wilk relied on Relerford and First Amendment precedents limiting criminalization of communications that negligently cause emotional distress | Court recognized statutory context but relied on First Amendment limits; because injunction targeted content broadly it was invalid as applied here |
| Procedural forfeiture of constitutional challenge | Flood argued Wilk forfeited the First Amendment challenge by not raising it at trial | Wilk noted he was pro se at trial | Court excused forfeiture and reached the merits given fully briefed issue and pro se status |
Key Cases Cited
- In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247 (Ill. 1989) (discusses prior restraints and heavy presumption against them)
- In re A Minor, 149 Ill. 2d 247 (Ill. 1992) (prior restraint context in juvenile reporting restrictions)
- Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (U.S. 1931) (landmark prohibition of prior restraints)
- New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (U.S. 1964) (First Amendment protection for criticism and limitations on defamation liability)
- Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (U.S. 1974) (defamation doctrine and limits on state liability for speech)
- Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (U.S. 2003) (definition and treatment of true threats)
- Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (U.S. 2015) (content-based speech restrictions trigger strict scrutiny)
- People v. Relerford, 2017 IL 121094 (Ill. 2017) (struck down criminal stalking statute provision criminalizing negligent communications that cause emotional distress)