Flonnory v. State
109 A.3d 1060
| Del. | 2015Background
- Police stopped Freddie Flonnory after traffic violations, observed signs of intoxication, and administered field sobriety and a portable breath test showing BAC > .16; he was arrested for DUI.
- At the station a phlebotomist drew Flonnory’s blood without a warrant and without the officer expressly asking for his permission; the lab later reported BAC .14.
- Flonnory moved to suppress the blood-test results under the Fourth Amendment; the Superior Court denied suppression, reasoning Delaware’s implied consent statute rendered the draw lawful without a warrant.
- The Superior Court reserved decision pending Missouri v. McNeely; after McNeely it concluded the implied consent statute still authorized admissibility and Flonnory was convicted at trial.
- On appeal the Delaware Supreme Court majority held a Fourth Amendment totality-of-the-circumstances consent analysis is required for warrantless blood draws and remanded for the trial court to apply that test; the dissent would have upheld the implied-consent statutory scheme.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Delaware’s implied consent statute eliminates the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement for blood draws | Flonnory: Implied consent does not substitute for a warrant; warrant requirement applies to bodily intrusions absent an exception | State: Statutory implied consent constitutes valid consent, making a warrant unnecessary when statutory preconditions are met | Majority: Statutory implied consent does not obviate the need for a Fourth Amendment analysis; warrantless blood draws still require an exception (exigency or voluntary consent) |
| Whether the blood draw here was voluntary consent under the Fourth Amendment | Flonnory: There was no voluntary consent; trial court failed to apply totality-of-circumstances test | State: Alternatively, consent (express or implied) was present and permissible | Held: Whether consent was voluntary must be decided by the trial court under the totality-of-the-circumstances; remand for that analysis |
| Applicability of McNeely to implied-consent statutes | Flonnory: McNeely supports needing case-by-case analysis for warrantless blood draws and does not validate blanket statutory authorizations | State/Dissent: McNeely addressed exigency only and did not invalidate implied-consent regimes | Held: Majority applies McNeely’s totality and case-by-case reasoning to consent claims; remand required. Dissent would have read McNeely narrowly and upheld statute |
| Remedy if consent exception fails | Flonnory: Suppress blood evidence and vacate conviction | State: Evidence admissible; conviction should stand | Held: If the trial court finds consent not voluntary, it must grant suppression, vacate conviction, and order a new trial |
Key Cases Cited
- Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (U.S. 1989) (distinguishing breath tests from blood tests as less intrusive)
- Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (U.S. 1966) (bodily intrusions ordinarily require a warrant absent emergency)
- Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (U.S. 2013) (natural dissipation of alcohol is not a per se exigency; warrants assessed case-by-case)
- Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (U.S. 1973) (voluntariness of consent assessed under totality of circumstances)
- Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (U.S. 1985) (invasions of bodily integrity implicate deep-rooted privacy expectations)
- South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (U.S. 1983) (addressing implied-consent and Fifth Amendment issues)
- State v. Wolf, 164 A.2d 865 (Del. 1960) (historical recognition that legislature could enact implied-consent scheme)
- Seth v. State, 592 A.2d 436 (Del. 1991) (Delaware precedent upholding implied-consent testing under probable cause and nonexcessive force)