974 N.W.2d 698
S.D.2022Background
- Jeremy and Lyndsey Flint divorced in Arizona (2018); their daughter V.F. (b.2016) originally lived under a shared‑custody order. Jeremy moved to South Dakota in 2019, registered the Arizona order, and sought primary physical custody; Lyndsey lived in California and later became a Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officer after extended training in Georgia.
- Before Lyndsey’s training she signed a short authorization allowing Jeremy to take V.F. to South Dakota while he transitioned out of the military; Lyndsey contends it did not authorize a permanent relocation.
- While Lyndsey completed training (Feb–Aug 2019) V.F. lived primarily with Jeremy in South Dakota; contact was maintained remotely and in‑person contact was limited for months. Interim relief denied Jeremy primary custody; court ordered a transitional shared month‑on/month‑off rotation.
- Custody trial (Jan. 2021) included a custody evaluator who favored Jeremy but described the case as close and noted concerns about Lyndsey’s employment/location changes; both parents were found fit.
- The circuit court awarded primary physical custody to Lyndsey, finding both parents fit but concluding Lyndsey’s short‑term training absences were for long‑term gain and that Jeremy had been less willing to foster frequent, meaningful contact between V.F. and Lyndsey.
- Jeremy appealed, arguing the court improperly discounted Lyndsey’s instability and abused its discretion; the South Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, giving deference to the trial court’s credibility findings and abuse‑of‑discretion standard.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Jeremy) | Defendant's Argument (Lyndsey) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did the trial court abuse its discretion in awarding primary physical custody to Lyndsey? | Court erred; award ignores Lyndsey’s post‑separation instability and relocation/career changes favoring Jeremy. | Lyndsey’s training absences were short‑term for long‑term stability; she is fit and now stable; court properly weighed best‑interest factors. | Affirmed — no abuse of discretion; court reasonably found best interests favored Lyndsey. |
| Did the court give "scant or incomplete" consideration to the Fuerstenberg stability factor? | Trial court failed to adequately analyze stability as required (Pietrzak). | Court considered stability and other Fuerstenberg factors; not required to make findings on every factor; weight is discretionary. | Affirmed — court sufficiently considered stability; differing conclusion was reasonable. |
| Are appellate attorney fees appropriate? | Jeremy sought fees; both parties requested fees on appeal. | Lyndsey also requested fees. | Denied — no award given given the close balance and litigation course. |
Key Cases Cited
- Fuerstenberg v. Fuerstenberg, 591 N.W.2d 798 (S.D. 1999) (sets traditional best‑interests factors used in custody decisions)
- Zepeda v. Zepeda, 632 N.W.2d 48 (S.D. 2001) (describes best‑interests standard as the court’s "brightest beacon")
- Evens v. Evens, 951 N.W.2d 268 (S.D. 2020) (custody determinations reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- Pietrzak v. Schroeder, 759 N.W.2d 734 (S.D. 2009) (abuse occurs when trial court’s review of custody factors is scant or incomplete)
- McCarty v. McCarty, 867 N.W.2d 355 (S.D. 2015) (court not required to make a specific finding under every Fuerstenberg category)
- Schieffer v. Schieffer, 826 N.W.2d 627 (S.D. 2013) (trial courts should use a balanced, systematic approach in custody analyses)
- Baun v. Estate of Kramlich, 667 N.W.2d 672 (S.D. 2003) (appellate courts defer to trial court on witness credibility and weight of evidence)