246 A.3d 540
Del.2021Background
- Fletcher and Feutz divorced in 2005 and executed a 2007 Consent Agreement requiring Fletcher to pay $2,250/month alimony and identifying three bases for modification/termination: (1) cohabitation, (2) appropriateness of employment, and (3) real and substantial change in circumstances.
- Feutz retired from full‑time school employment in 2016, citing chronic insomnia and anxiety after several family traumas; she later accepted a part‑time clerical job in May 2018 and also receives a modest pension, producing roughly $33K/year combined.
- Fletcher filed a Petition to Modify or Terminate Alimony in January 2018; by then Fletcher had significant assets and had sold his business in 2018; he is remarried and is his current wife’s primary caretaker.
- At trial the Family Court found Feutz’s part‑time work to be appropriate employment, concluded there was no real and substantial change of circumstances, found Feutz was not cohabiting with her long‑term partner, and awarded Feutz attorney’s fees for defense of the petition.
- On appeal the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Family Court’s findings that Feutz was appropriately employed and not cohabiting, reversed the fee award (holding the release in the Agreement barred the fee award), and remanded the substantial‑change issue for further factual work (attributing any rental income and correcting expense figures).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Fletcher) | Defendant's Argument (Feutz) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Appropriate employment | Feutz offered no objective medical proof of incapacity and vocational expert showed she could work full‑time and earn $45–47K | Feutz’s insomnia/anxiety disabled her from full‑time work/commute; part‑time job plus pension is appropriate | Affirmed: Family Court permissibly found Feutz impaired based on credibility of testimony and reasonably discounted vocational report |
| Real and substantial change in circumstances | Fletcher said Feutz’s income rose and expenses fell and an adult lived with her (tenant), so relative positions changed enough to modify/terminate alimony | Feutz said tenant performed services (no rent), and her overall economic situation remained similar | Remanded: Court must determine whether to attribute rental income and correctly calculate expenses to decide substantial change |
| Cohabitation under §1512(g) | Fletcher argued weekend residence, sharing keys, vacations, and presenting as a couple amounted to regular residence/cohabitation | Feutz said they maintained separate homes, did not share major expenses or leave personal items, and spent most time apart | Affirmed: Family Court reasonably concluded they did not ‘regularly reside’ together and thus not cohabiting |
| Attorney's fees under Agreement | Fletcher contended the Agreement’s broad release waived fee claims; alternatively, fees might be available under statute | Feutz urged fees for defending modification petition | Reversed: Paragraph 21’s broad, unambiguous release bars attorney’s fees; Court will not imply omitted statutory fee rights into the contract |
Key Cases Cited
- Brown v. Div. of Fam. Servs., 14 A.3d 507 (Del. 2011) (standard of appellate review for Family Court decisions)
- Stewart v. Stewart, 41 A.3d 401 (Del. 2012) (review of Family Court factual findings)
- Paul v. Paul, 60 A.3d 1080 (Del. 2012) (definition and analysis of cohabitation/‘regularly residing’)
- Husband, J. v. Wife, J., 413 A.2d 1267 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1979) (test for real and substantial change in circumstances warranting modification)
- Osborn ex rel. Osborn v. Kemp, 991 A.2d 1153 (Del. 2010) (objective theory of contract interpretation)
- Salamone v. Gorman, 106 A.3d 354 (Del. 2014) (priority to parties’ intent in contract construction)
- Murfey v. WHC Ventures, 236 A.3d 337 (Del. 2020) (caution against implying contractual terms not included by parties)