Fletcher v. Dickhaut, 834 F. Supp. 2d 10

Fletcher was convicted in 2002 in Massachusetts Superior Court of breaking and entering and larceny, and was adjudged an habitual offender under M.G.L. c. 279, § 25, with a 10–20 year sentence.
Fletcher pursued multiple state-court appeals challenging the habitual-offender enhancement and related issues; those challenges were rejected by the MAC and SJC on direct appeal.
Fletcher filed two federal habeas petitions (the First Petition in 2006 and the Second Petition opened in 2008) amid a complex sequence of dismissals, stays, and amendments.
This Court ultimately dismissed Fletcher’s Second Petition on the merits, after extensive procedural history, and denied a COA on Grounds One and Three but granted a COA on Ground Two.
Ground One argued vagueness and evidentiary insufficiency of the habitual-offender statute; Ground Two argued denial of right to counsel at the habitual-offender phase; Ground Three argued denial of due process on appellate review.
The Court held that the state court decisions were not contrary to clearly established federal law, and that Fletcher was not entitled to habeas relief on Grounds One and Three; Ground Two was the only ground to warrant a COA.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Habitual-offender statute sufficiency	Fletcher argued statute vague and insufficient evidence	Commonwealth argued statute properly interpreted; evidence supports habitual status	No relief; statute properly applied; unanimous federal-law standards not violated
Right to counsel at habitual phase	Waiver of counsel at trial should not extend to habitual-offender phase per Kulesa	Waiver carried over; trial judge protected rights; no new waiver required	Relief denied; COA granted on Ground Two
Due process on appellate review	MAC mischaracterized merits; deprived meaningful review	State courts carefully considered merits; not a due process violation	Relief denied; COA denied on Ground Three

Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (U.S. 1991) (habeas review limited to constitutional rights)
Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (U.S. 1997) (vagueness standard for criminal statutes)
Kulesa, 455 Mass. 447 (Mass. 2009) (right to counsel at habitual offender proceedings)
Tuitt, 393 Mass. 801, 473 N.E.2d 1103 (Mass. 1985) (habitu al offender statute understood as sentence enhancement)
Allen, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 413, 494 N.E.2d 55 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986) (habitu al offender status not dependent on three years served)
Pelletier, 449 Mass. 392, 868 N.E.2d 613 (Mass. 2007) (habitu al offender procedure is sentencing phase, not separate trial)
Commonwealth v. Scott, 824 N.E.2d 487 (Mass. App. Ct. 2005) (statutory interpretation of habitual offender statute)
Commonwealth v. Tuitt, 473 N.E.2d 1103 (Mass. 1985) (interpretation of ‘committed’ vs. parole/discharge in three strikes)
Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 61 Mass.App.Ct. 1108, 808 N.E.2d 1258 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (factual appellate rulings on habitual offender sufficiency)
Commonwealth v. Pelletier, 449 Mass. 392, 868 N.E.2d 613 (Mass. 2007) (procedure for habitual offender phase)