65 So. 3d 763
La. Ct. App.2011Background
- Fleming, a Garda Security guard (formerly Vance International), worked the 7:00 PM–7:00 AM shift at a grain elevator plant in Paulina, LA.
- On January 1, 2009, a car pulled into the guarded lot, parked under the single functioning light for about 18–19 minutes, and shined its lights while the driver remained inside.
- Fleming, alone in a poorly lit, closed plant, did not expect a vehicle to enter; she did not use a firearm that night and did not approach the car.
- Fleming notified her supervisor Bryant about the incident after observing the car; she was too frightened to call 911, and she retrieved a pipe from her jeep for protection.
- She sought psychiatric/psychological treatment post-incident and carried preexisting mental-health history; medical opinions were split on PTSD versus other diagnoses.
- The Office of Workers’ Compensation (OWC) judge concluded the incident caused a mental injury and that it was sudden, unexpected, and extraordinary, but on appeal the court reversed, applying an objective standard and dismissing the claim with prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the mental injury was caused by a sudden, unexpected, and extraordinary stress. | Fleming—stress from the incident qualifies under 23:1021(8)(b). | Stress from the incident did not constitute sudden/extraordinary stress under the statute. | Not met under the objective standard; reversed. |
| Whether the trial court applied the correct standard (objective) for evaluating stress. | OWC applied the proper standard (from Fleming’s perspective). | Court should view stress from the employee’s perspective. | Trial court erred by using an improper standard; de novo review required. |
| Whether the evidence supports causation of PTSD under the objective standard. | Medical opinions link PTSD to the incident. | Experts disagree; underlying history reduces likelihood of a PTSD diagnosis from this incident. | Under the objective standard, the record fails to establish causation. |
| Whether preexisting mental-health history affects compensability. | Preexisting conditions can be aggravated by work-related stress. | Preexisting history does not automatically bar compensation if aggravated by an injury. | Preexistence does not salvage the claim here; the stress did not satisfy the statutory standard. |
| Whether the claim should be dismissed with prejudice on remand. | — | — | Dismissal with prejudice affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Partin v. Merchants & Farmers Bank, 810 So.2d 1118 (La. 2002) (defines stress focus under 1021(8)(b) and emphasizes objective evaluation of stress)
- Ardoin v. Firestone Polymers, L.L.C., 56 So.3d 215 (La. 2011) (mental/mental claim requires specific statutory framework)
- Delrie v. Peabody Magnet High School, 40 So.3d 1158 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2010) (evaluates extraordinary stress in school setting contexts)
- Freeman v. Poulan/Weed Eater, 630 So.2d 733 (La. 1994) (standard of review for manifest error and deference to fact-finder)
- Seal v. Gaylord Container Corp., 704 So.2d 1161 (La. 1997) (articulates manifest error standard and review framework)
- Ferrell v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 650 So.2d 742 (La. 1995) (clarifies de novo fact review in welfare of appellate courts)
- Lloyd v. Shady Lake Nursing Home, Inc., 47 So.3d 609 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2010) (advocates for statutory interpretation of 1021(8)(e) equivalents)