Fjn LLC v. Vijay Parakh, 331889

Frank Nazar Sr. and Jr., via corporate entities, renovated Gino’s Surf in Harrison Twp. Phase II (an antique car museum/restaurant) was completed in Feb 2009; plaintiffs believed they were entitled to a certificate of occupancy.
Township building official Vijay Parakh informed plaintiffs Phase II lacked a certificate and attempted to prevent a February 6, 2009 grand opening; he prepared a written report to the Township Board describing safety violations and overcrowding.
Plaintiffs sued in federal court (substantive due process); a jury later awarded plaintiffs economic and punitive damages against defendants.
In state court plaintiffs sued for declaratory relief (Count I) and for libel/slander (Counts II–IV) based on Parakh’s report and alleged verbal statements. The trial court limited the defamation claims to statements unrelated to the occupancy issue.
On remand from this Court, Parakh moved for summary disposition asserting the Board report was absolutely privileged; the trial court granted summary disposition on Counts II–IV and ordered declaratory relief on Count I (the occupancy claim not at issue on appeal).
The Court of Appeals affirmed: it held Parakh prepared the report within his official duties for a quasi‑legislative proceeding, so the report was absolutely privileged and not actionable as defamation.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Parakh’s report is absolutely privileged	Report was disseminated to media/third parties, so privilege inapplicable	Report prepared for Board in furtherance of official duties; absolute privilege applies	Report is absolutely privileged; defamation claims fail as a matter of law
Whether plaintiffs raised a factual dispute on publication to third parties	Newspaper article and community statements show publication by Parakh	No evidence Parakh distributed report to media; plaintiffs must prove unprivileged third‑party publication	No competent evidence Parakh published to third parties; plaintiffs’ speculation insufficient
Whether absolute privilege can be asserted despite not pleaded explicitly	Privilege was not raised in answer so defense waived	Privilege is a form of immunity and Parakh asserted immunity, giving plaintiffs notice	Privilege need not be separately pleaded; immunity notice suffices
Whether falsity/malice or damages preclude summary disposition	Malice and damages exist (forensic accountant report) preventing summary disposition	Absolute privilege defeats liability even if statements were false or malicious	Absolute privilege bars liability regardless of falsity/malice; summary disposition proper

Ross v. Consumers Power Co., 420 Mich 567 (governs immunity for intentional torts)
Kefgen v. Davidson, 241 Mich App 611 (definition and elements of defamation; privilege doctrine)
Froling v. Carpenter, 203 Mich App 368 (extends absolute privilege to public officials communicating in furtherance of official duty to subordinate legislative/quasi‑legislative bodies)
Oesterle v. Wallace, 272 Mich App 260 (statement absolutely privileged is nonactionable even if false and malicious)
Couch v. Schultz, 193 Mich App 292 (discussion of absolutely privileged communications)
Cuddington v. United Health Servs., Inc., 298 Mich App 264 (standard of review for MCR 2.116(C)(10))