FISHER, KRYSTAL AND DAVID VS. CITY OF MILLVILLEÂ (TAX COURT OF NEW JERSEY), 164 A.3d 447

Background

Krystal Fisher injured in Oct. 2002 during Army training at Fort Leonard Wood (fell from two‑story building); she continued service and was later assigned to Fort Stewart, GA.
Her unit deployed to Afghanistan, but Fisher remained stateside on the unit’s Rear Detachment performing logistics, inventory, MP duties, training, and other support tasks; she was not sent overseas.
Honorably discharged Dec. 20, 2003; declared 100% disabled by the VA on May 21, 2014; disability was conceded to be service‑connected.
Fisher applied for a New Jersey disabled‑veteran homestead tax exemption under N.J.S.A. 54:4‑3.30; the Millville tax assessor denied the claim and the denial was upheld by the county board and the Tax Court.
Tax Court (Judge Cimino) granted summary judgment to the City, holding Fisher’s injury was not suffered “in a theater of operation and in direct support of that operation” as required for Operation Enduring Freedom service credit.
Appellate Division affirms: statutory text requires service in a theater of operation and direct support there; Fisher’s stateside Rear Detachment duties did not meet that definition.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Fisher’s service/disability qualifies as "active service in time of war" under the statute (Operation Enduring Freedom)	Fisher: statute should be read broadly; direct support can include stateside Rear Detachment work that directly supported a deployed unit	City: statute requires service in a theater of operation and direct support there; Fisher’s stateside service does not satisfy the geographic and service‑incurred injury requirements	Held for City: statute requires service in a theater of operation and direct support of that operation; Fisher’s injuries were not suffered in that theater or in direct support there, so no exemption
Whether the statutory geographic requirement ("theater of operation") is flexible enough to include some stateside support roles	Fisher: modern warfare makes battlefield exposure less geographically fixed; prior cases allow non‑battlefield direct support to qualify	City: statutory language and legislative history show the inclusion of a geographic component was purposeful and limits eligibility	Held for City: legislative text is clear; geographic limitation is part of the definition and was intentionally included
Whether Wellington and similar precedents require extending the exemption to Fisher	Fisher: Wellington and other Tax Court decisions support a broader reading to include some stateside exposures	City: those precedents are fact‑specific and do not compel extending the exemption where there was no exposure to battlefield harms	Held for City: Wellington is distinguishable (it involved direct exposure to enemy weapons); Fisher lacked comparable exposure
Whether the statutory scheme violates equal protection because some military roles (historically closed to women) affect eligibility	Fisher: argues potential disparate impact because women were historically excluded from certain combat roles	City: Fisher’s placement stateside was due to her injury, not a gender‑based policy; no equal protection basis was shown	Held for City: no equal protection violation found; facts show Fisher’s status was due to injury, not discriminatory policy

Key Cases Cited

Conley v. Guerrero, 228 N.J. 339 (interpretation of summary judgment standard and appellate review)
Meehan v. Antonellis, 226 N.J. 216 (appellate courts interpret statutes de novo)
Mort. Grader, Inc. v. Ward & Olivio, L.L.P., 225 N.J. 423 (statutory interpretation principles)
Cashin v. Bello, 223 N.J. 328 (plain‑language rule in statutory interpretation)
N.J. Carpenters Apprentice Training & Educ. Fund v. Borough of Kenilworth, 147 N.J. 171 (tax exemptions strictly construed; claimant bears burden)
Hubbard v. Reed, 168 N.J. 387 (courts enforce clear statutory text)