Fischer v. ZRT, 892 F.3d 915

Background

Fischer and others filed a class-action suit in the N.D. Ill. against Magyar Államvasutak Zrt. (Hungarian national railway) alleging transportation of Hungarian Jews to concentration camps and related personal/property losses during the Holocaust.
In 2012 and 2015 this Court held plaintiffs had not exhausted remedies in Hungary and had not shown the railway engaged in U.S. commercial activity necessary for FSIA expropriation-exception jurisdiction; the 2015 opinion left open relief if Hungarian remedies were arbitrarily or unreasonably blocked.
Putative class member Iren Gittel Kellner sued the railway in Hungary in 2016; the Budapest court dismissed her claims for lack of corroborating evidence for property losses and for statutory cutoffs on noneconomic damages.
In June 2017 a three-page "Motion to Reinstate" was filed in the district court, styled by the "Plaintiff," seeking reinstatement based on Kellner’s Hungarian litigation and arguing exhaustion had been frustrated.
The district court treated the motion as filed by Kellner (not by Fischer or a named plaintiff) and denied it on the narrow ground that Kellner lacked standing because no class had been certified.
Fischer appealed the denial, but the Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the order applied to Kellner (who did not appeal) and did not finally resolve claims of the named plaintiffs.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Who filed the motion to reinstate?	Fischer implicitly argued the motion should be treated as coming from a named plaintiff to revive the case.	District court: motion was filed by Kellner, a putative class member, not a named plaintiff.	Motion was treated as filed by Kellner; Fischer did not seek reconsideration below.
Standing to move to reopen without a certified class	Kellner (through the motion) argued her Hungarian proceedings excuse other plaintiffs from further exhaustion.	Railway argued Kellner lacked standing because no class was certified and she was not a named party.	Kellner lacked standing to reopen the case; district court correctly denied on that basis.
Appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s denial	Fischer argued he could appeal the denial as an aggrieved party and that Kellner's Hungarian outcome should excuse exhaustion for named plaintiffs.	Railway argued Fischer lacked standing to appeal an order applying only to Kellner; the order was not final as to named plaintiffs.	Seventh Circuit lacked jurisdiction: Fischer suffered no adverse effect from denial as to Kellner; order was not a final decision barring revival of named plaintiffs’ claims.
Whether court should decide exhaustion/substance on appeal	Fischer urged the court to rule that Kellner’s Hungarian experience shows exhaustion would be futile for others.	Railway opposed substantive review absent factual findings and finality below.	Court declined to decide exhaustion merits in the first instance; remanded that such issues belong to the district court.

Key Cases Cited

Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d 661 (7th Cir.) (explaining exhaustion and commercial-activity requirements under FSIA expropriation exception)
Fischer v. Magyar Államvasutak Zrt., 777 F.3d 847 (7th Cir.) (clarifying when foreign remedies must be exhausted and when U.S. courts may entertain Holocaust-era claims)
Dietz v. Bouldin, 136 S. Ct. 1885 (2016) (district courts retain power to modify or rescind orders before final judgment)
Chessie Logistics Co. v. Krinos Holdings, Inc., 867 F.3d 852 (7th Cir.) (defining when an order constitutes a clear legal bar and is final for §1291 purposes)
Wachovia Sec., LLC v. Loop Corp., 726 F.3d 899 (7th Cir.) (appellate standing requires an adverse effect from the challenged order)
Houben v. Telular Corp., 231 F.3d 1066 (7th Cir.) (appellate jurisdiction generally limited to final district court judgments)
Transamerica Ins. Co. v. South, 125 F.3d 392 (7th Cir.) (standing and appellate review principles)
Cabral v. City of Evansville, Ind., 759 F.3d 639 (7th Cir.) (party must be aggrieved to appeal)
Raley v. Hyundai Motor Co., 642 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir.) (only sufficiently aggrieved parties have standing to appeal)