Fischer v. CTMI, L.L.C.
479 S.W.3d 231
| Tex. | 2016Background
- In 2007 Fischer sold his tax-consulting business to CTMI (owned by Boozer and Raymond) under an asset-purchase agreement; Fischer stayed on as an employee through 2010.
- Purchase price was structured: $800,000 at closing plus four annual ‘‘earn-out’’ payments; each earn-out had a minimum payment and a 30% adjustment tied to annual “business revenue.”
- The 2010 adjustment uniquely included revenue from projects that were pending (in-progress) as of December 31, 2010, allocated by each project’s percentage complete as of that date; the contract stated those percentages “will have to be mutually agreed upon by [CTMI] and [Fischer].”
- After disputes over various payments, the parties settled most claims but severed CTMI’s declaratory-judgment challenge to the enforceability of the 2010 pending-projects clause.
- The trial court held the pending-projects clause enforceable; the court of appeals reversed, calling it an unenforceable “agreement to agree.” The Texas Supreme Court granted review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Fischer) | Defendant's Argument (CTMI) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 2010 pending-projects clause is an unenforceable "agreement to agree" for indefiniteness | Clause is enforceable: parties intended to be bound; clause supplies a definite standard (percentage complete) and prior practice + performance supply the missing facts | Clause is unenforceable because it requires mutual agreement on completion percentages; courts cannot compel parties to reach agreement or rewrite the contract | The clause is enforceable: it supplies an objective standard and a court can imply reasonable terms; not an unenforceable agreement to agree |
Key Cases Cited
- Pace Corp. v. Jackson, 284 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1955) (contract must be reasonably certain to furnish basis for remedy)
- Fort Worth Indep. Sch. Dist. v. City of Fort Worth, 22 S.W.3d 831 (Tex. 2000) (an agreement leaving material matters for future adjustment may be an unenforceable agreement to agree)
- Radford v. McNeny, 104 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. 1937) (agreement to agree is nugatory if material terms are not specified)
- T.O. Stanley Boot Co. v. Bank of El Paso, 847 S.W.2d 218 (Tex. 1992) (material terms must be agreed before enforcement)
- McCalla v. Baker's Campground, Inc., 416 S.W.3d 416 (Tex. 2013) (an agreement to agree can be enforceable if it contains all material terms)
- Bendalin v. Delgado, 406 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. 1966) (when parties have done everything else, courts may presume a reasonable price)
- ATOFINA Petrochemicals, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 185 S.W.3d 440 (Tex. 2005) (usage, course of dealing or industry practice can supply missing contract terms)
- Scott v. Ingle Bros. Pac., 489 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1972) (part performance can show parties intended a binding agreement)
- Playoff Corp. v. Blackwell, 300 S.W.3d 451 (Tex. 2009) (agreement to agree is unenforceable when parties leave a valuation method to future negotiation)
