First Midwest Bank v. City of Chicago
988 F.3d 978
| 7th Cir. | 2021Background
- Off-duty Chicago police officer Patrick Kelly shot his friend Michael LaPorta after a night of drinking; LaPorta survived with catastrophic, permanent injuries.
- LaPorta sued the City of Chicago under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Monell), alleging municipal policy failures: no effective early-warning system, inadequate investigation/discipline, and a code of silence.
- At trial the jury found the City liable, concluding two policy failures caused the shooting, and awarded $44.7 million; plaintiff’s counsel urged the jury the verdict would prompt systemic police reform.
- The City renewed its Rule 50(b) motion arguing DeShaney bars a due-process claim based on private violence; the district court denied the motion and rejected the City’s objections to counsel’s “send a message” closing.
- The Seventh Circuit reversed: because Kelly acted as a private citizen and no special-relationship or state-created-danger exception to DeShaney was pleaded or proved, there was no constitutional deprivation and Monell liability cannot stand.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether LaPorta suffered a Fourteenth Amendment due‑process deprivation from private-actor violence | City policies caused Kelly to shoot; that caused a deprivation of bodily integrity | DeShaney bars state duty to protect from private violence absent an applicable exception | Held for City: DeShaney bars the claim; no duty shown because Kelly acted as a private citizen and no exception applies |
| Whether Monell liability can attach for municipal policy failures that allegedly led a private actor to commit violence | Monell allows municipal liability where policies/customs cause constitutional violations; jury found causation and deliberate indifference | Monell requires an underlying constitutional violation (which is absent here under DeShaney) and strict proof of policy, culpability, and ‘moving force’ causation | Held for City: even if Monell elements were alleged, they cannot supply a constitutional predicate where none exists |
| Whether DeShaney’s limits apply to Monell claims (i.e., can Monell bypass DeShaney) | Monell framework governs municipal liability so DeShaney is inapplicable if jury found municipal causation | DeShaney defines the substantive scope of due process and applies before Monell liability can be imposed | Held for City: Monell and DeShaney address different subjects; DeShaney’s rule limiting due‑process claims against state inaction applies and was misapplied below |
| Whether improper closing argument ("send a message" / fictitious letter) required a new trial | Counsel urged punitive/deterrent award and read an emotional fictitious letter to jury | City objected as prejudicial and improper (municipalities immune from punitive damages) | Court did not reach because merits reversal dispositive; district court had erred in allowing some of the argument but error deemed harmless below |
Key Cases Cited
- DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (Due Process Clause does not impose an affirmative duty on the state to protect individuals from private actors; limited exceptions exist)
- Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipalities are liable under § 1983 only for their own unconstitutional policies or customs, not under respondeat superior)
- Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) (Monell requires proof of municipal fault—deliberate indifference—and that the policy was the moving force behind the violation)
- Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510 (7th Cir. 1990) (pleading-stage Monell allegations survived where facts could show the municipality created the danger; distinguished here)
- County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1988) (substantive due‑process claims require conduct that "shocks the conscience")
- Latuszkin v. City of Chicago, 250 F.3d 502 (7th Cir. 2001) (off‑duty officer’s private conduct did not give rise to constitutional duty by the city under DeShaney)
- Thomas v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293 (7th Cir. 2010) (municipality can be liable under Monell even if individual officers are not, but an underlying constitutional violation must exist)
- Glisson v. Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 849 F.3d 372 (7th Cir. 2017) (systemic policy failures can amount to deliberate indifference where a constitutional right exists)