Finfrock v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 90

Gregory Finfrock (in his 40s) was convicted by a jury of two counts of rape and one count of sexual indecency with a child based on admitted sexual acts against a 12‑year‑old victim; jury sentenced him to 30, 30, and 6 years respectively, and the judge ordered the terms to run consecutively for a total of 66 years.
At trial the defense requested model (AMCI2d) jury instructions for the sentencing phase explaining the jury’s ability to recommend consecutive sentences, parole/transfer eligibility, meritorious good‑time effects, and the 70% parole rule; the court declined to give those instructions.
The State opposed the instructions as unnecessary and likely to confuse the jury; the trial judge refused them after considering both sides, explaining the nonbinding nature and potential for confusion.
During deliberations the jury asked whether the rape sentences run concurrent or consecutive; the judge declined to give the previously‑proffered nonbinding recommendation instructions and instead told the jury to rely on the instructions already given (which included an admonition not to consider rules of law not included in the instructions).
Defense counsel told the court he felt comfortable with the court’s response to the jury question and did not renew his request for the omitted instructions; the court imposed consecutive sentences and Finfrock appealed only the refusal to give those sentencing‑related instructions.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Finfrock)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether the trial court abused discretion in refusing to give model instructions allowing the jury to recommend consecutive sentences	Jury should be informed of ability to recommend consecutive terms so sentencing deliberations aren’t based on guesswork	Instructions are nonbinding, unnecessary, and would confuse the jury	No abuse of discretion; refusal affirmed
Whether the court erred by refusing parole‑eligibility and 70%‑rule instructions	Jury should know parole/transfer eligibility and 70% rule so they can meaningfully decide sentence impact	Parole/70% instructions are unnecessary, confusing, and parole is determined by DOC, not the court	No error; trial court properly declined to instruct jury on parole/70%
Whether instructions on transfer/meritorious good time must be given at sentencing	Jury should know transfer/meritorious good time can affect time served	Such information is discretionary ("may"), not mandatory, and may confuse jurors	No error; statute is permissive and trial court discretion prevails
Whether appellant waived objection by counsel’s acquiescence when jury asked question	Refusal was prejudicial regardless of counsel’s later remark	Defense counsel told court he was ‘‘comfortable’’ with the court’s response and did not renew request, thus waiving further objection	Held waiver/acquiescence; appellant failed to show prejudice or abuse of discretion

Craigg v. State, 424 S.W.3d 264 (Ark. 2012) (abuse‑of‑discretion standard for instructional rulings)
Squyres v. State, 476 S.W.3d 839 (Ark. Ct. App. 2015) (high threshold for reversing instructional decisions)
Miller v. State, 248 S.W.3d 487 (Ark. Ct. App. 2007) (no reversal absent showing of prejudice)
Clark v. State, 287 S.W.3d 567 (Ark. 2008) (correct statement of law in a proffered instruction does not mandate giving it)
Benjamin v. State, 285 S.W.3d 264 (Ark. Ct. App. 2008) (affirming refusal to give nonbinding consecutive‑recommendation instruction)
Walden v. State, 419 S.W.3d 739 (Ark. Ct. App. 2012) (statutory language that sentencing court "may" consider parole/transfer information is permissive)
Carroll v. Hobbs, 442 S.W.3d 834 (Ark. 2014) (parole eligibility determined by Department of Correction, not sentencing court)
Hickman v. State, 277 S.W.3d 217 (Ark. 2008) (omission of instruction reversible only where it infects the entire trial)
Henderson v. State, 80 S.W.3d 374 (Ark. 2002) (same rule on instructional omission and due process)