Finch v. State, 542 S.W.3d 143

Finch was tried by a Pulaski County jury and convicted of aggravated residential burglary, aggravated assault (family/household member), and first-degree terroristic threatening; a firearm enhancement and habitual-offender sentences produced life + 15 years and a $10,000 fine. Kidnapping count resulted in a mistrial (hung jury).
Finch repeatedly sought to discharge appointed counsel and to proceed pro se (oral requests and a written Motion to Waive Counsel and Proceed Pro Se). The court ordered mental evaluations and found Finch disruptive; the court denied his requests to represent himself.
During guilt-phase deliberations a juror (Juror 4) used his cell phone to look something up despite instructions not to research the case, then shared the information with fellow jurors; the court removed that juror and substituted an alternate but denied Finch’s mistrial motion and later denied a motion for new trial.
After trial Finch filed a motion for new trial (and an amended motion attaching counsel’s affidavit recounting that Juror 4 had looked up the definition of “hung jury”); the court treated the amendment as a motion for reconsideration and denied relief.
On appeal Finch argued (1) the court erred in refusing his requests to self-represent and (2) the court abused its discretion by denying mistrial and refusing to inquire of jurors about the extraneous information. The majority affirmed; one justice dissented, urging reversal and remand.

Issue	Finch’s Argument	State’s Argument	Held
Denial of right to self-represent	Finch contends he made timely, unequivocal requests to proceed pro se and was entitled under Faretta; the court’s questioning was inadequate and denial reversible.	The court properly found requests not unequivocal and that Finch’s conduct (disruptive talking) could prevent fair, orderly exposition; competency inquiry was pending.	Affirmed: requests were not unequivocal and court could conclude Finch engaged in conduct that justified denial; competency concerns supported caution.
Juror misconduct (cell-phone research during deliberations) and denial of mistrial / inquiry	Finch argues the court abused discretion by denying mistrial and by not permitting questioning of jurors to show prejudice from extraneous information (definition of “hung jury”).	The State says Rule 606(b) limits inquiry into deliberations, no reasonable probability of prejudice shown, and juror testimony about deliberative matters is barred; trial court did not abuse discretion.	Affirmed: court erred in not conducting fuller inquiry but no reasonable probability of prejudice shown here (definition of “hung jury” unlikely to affect guilt); removal of juror and replacement with alternate sufficient.

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (recognition of constitutional right to self-representation)
Mayo v. State, 336 Ark. 275 (requirements for waiver of counsel; competency and knowing waiver)
Bledsoe v. State, 337 Ark. 403 (advice a court should give before accepting self-representation)
Collins v. State, 338 Ark. 1 (factors for determining intelligent waiver of counsel)
Holsombach v. State, 368 Ark. 415 (mistrial is drastic remedy; moving party must prove misconduct and reasonable possibility of prejudice)
Dimas-Martinez v. State, 385 S.W.3d 238 (internet/email/social-media juror misconduct—caution about cell-phone access during deliberations)
Franks v. State, 306 Ark. 75 (jurors’ independent dictionary research may not be prejudicial in every case)
Davis v. State, 330 Ark. 501 (purpose of Rule 606(b) balancing secrecy of deliberations with correcting irregularities)
Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (verdict must be based solely on evidence presented in court)
Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (outside influences must not determine jury conclusions)