15 F.4th 52
1st Cir.2021Background
- Finamore owned property through which a long-used public way, Cedar Street, ran; a private survey led him to believe a portion was his and he sought to block public access.
- State litigation produced a judgment for the town, which was later vacated and remanded on appeal; Finamore (mistakenly, as court treated it) believed he could block the road pending retrial.
- On October 13, 2015, Finamore installed orange plastic fencing across the disputed segment; a crowd gathered and town officials and three officers (Miglionico, Yannino, Kaminski) ordered removal.
- Finamore refused, was arrested for disturbing the peace and disorderly conduct, was detained for several hours (claims loss of consciousness and deprivation of medication), and the criminal charges were later dismissed/nolle prossed.
- Finamore sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act, and various common-law claims (false arrest/imprisonment, malicious prosecution, civil conspiracy, IIED); the district court granted summary judgment for defendants and Finamore appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) §1983 / MCRA false arrest (probable cause) | Finamore says officers lacked probable cause to arrest him for blocking the road. | Officers say their on-scene observations and consultation with municipal officials supplied probable cause to arrest for disturbing the peace and disorderly conduct. | Probable cause existed for both offenses; §1983 and MCRA claims fail. |
| 2) Common-law false arrest / false imprisonment | Arrest and confinement were unlawful and unsupported by probable cause. | Probable cause justified the arrest and short confinement. | Officers had legal justification; summary judgment for defendants affirmed. |
| 3) Malicious prosecution | Finamore argues prosecution was malicious and lacked probable cause. | Defendants contend they had probable cause and no evidence of malice. | Malicious-prosecution fails because probable cause existed and no evidentiary basis for malice. |
| 4) Civil conspiracy | Finamore alleges officers and municipal officials conspired to effect a false arrest. | Defendants note no underlying tort (no false arrest) and the consultation was legitimate. | Conspiracy claim fails because underlying tort (false arrest) is absent. |
| 5) Intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) | Leaving Finamore without medication and detaining him caused severe emotional distress. | Defendants say detention was brief, no evidence of medical incident or severe distress, and conduct not extreme/outrageous. | IIED fails for lack of evidence of extreme conduct and severe emotional harm. |
Key Cases Cited
- Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) (probable-cause standard for warrantless arrests)
- Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (officers may arrest for minor offenses without weighing necessity)
- Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (pragmatic, totality-of-the-circumstances approach to probable cause)
- United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965) (government officials are generally reliable sources for probable-cause information)
- Roche v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249 (1st Cir. 1996) (practical focus for probable-cause inquiry)
- Commonwealth v. Orlando, 359 N.E.2d 310 (Mass. 1977) (two-part test for disturbing the peace)
- Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14 (1st Cir. 1999) (Massachusetts disorderly-conduct standards explained)
- Limone v. United States, 579 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2009) (elements of malicious prosecution under Massachusetts law)
- Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 355 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1976) (elements of IIED under Massachusetts law)
- Coblyn v. Kennedy's, Inc., 268 N.E.2d 860 (Mass. 1971) (probable-cause standard under Massachusetts law)
- Santiago v. Fenton, 891 F.2d 373 (1st Cir. 1989) (MCRA claim premised on false arrest requires lack of probable cause)