Filosi v. Elec. Boat Corp., 330 Conn. 231

Decedent worked at Electric Boat from 1961–1998 and had occupational asbestos exposure and a long smoking history; he died of high‑grade neuroendocrine lung cancer in 2012.
Plaintiff (widow/executor) filed claims under both the Connecticut Workers' Compensation Act and the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act; an ALJ conducted a Longshore hearing in 2013.
At the Longshore hearing plaintiff’s experts (Welch, DeGraff) testified asbestos was a contributing cause; the ALJ found the §20(a) presumption triggered, allowed defendant to rebut, then weighed all evidence and credited plaintiff’s experts, concluding asbestos was a work‑related cause and awarding Longshore benefits.
The state workers’ compensation commissioner refused to give preclusive effect to the ALJ decision, found smoking was the predominant cause, and dismissed the state claim.
The Compensation Review Board reversed, concluding the ALJ had applied the same "substantial contributing factor" standard as Connecticut law and that collateral estoppel precluded relitigation of causation; the Supreme Court affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether collateral estoppel bars defendant from relitigating causation in state WC after ALJ Longshore award	ALJ applied the substantial‑contributing‑factor standard (credited expert saying asbestos was a "substantial contributing cause"), so issue was actually litigated and necessarily decided	Longshore Act uses a lower/varied causation standard; ALJ did not explicitly adopt the state substantial‑factor test, so preclusion is inappropriate	Court: Look to the standard as applied by the ALJ; because ALJ credited an expert who said asbestos was a "substantial contributing cause," collateral estoppel applies
Whether differing federal/state causation standards defeat collateral estoppel	Lafayette supports parity of burdens; Birnie requires examination of the ALJ’s actual applied standard — here it matches the state standard	Birnie and federal precedents show Longshore causation can be broader; without clear ALJ articulation defendant should be allowed to relitigate	Court: Adopt Birnie's approach (compare standard as applied). On these facts the ALJ applied the substantial‑factor standard, so differing standards do not defeat preclusion

Birnie v. Electric Boat Corp., 288 Conn. 392 (holding that preclusion depends on the causation standard actually applied by the federal ALJ)
Lafayette v. General Dynamics Corp., 255 Conn. 762 (discussing preclusive effect of administrative determinations and burdens under Longshore/ state schemes)
Sapko v. State, 305 Conn. 360 (clarifying Connecticut’s "substantial factor" causation standard)
Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191 (noting a final judgment has preclusive effect even if wrong)
Director, OWCP v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267 (describing burdens of proof under the Longshore Act)