140 F. Supp. 3d 1
D.D.C.2015Background
- Fillmore, age 48 (revealed in opposition), worked at AT&T from Jan 2011 until his termination in early 2014; he was promoted, transferred, counseled for performance, and placed on short-term disability in Aug–Oct 2013.
- AT&T announced elimination of FSR positions in Aug 2013; Fillmore returned from leave, reported missing inventory, was removed from inventory duties, suspended without pay on Nov 15, 2013, and later discharged (DOES record cites alleged fraudulent alteration of phone counts).
- Fillmore filed a pro se complaint alleging age-discrimination claims under the ADEA against both AT&T and CWA Local 2336 (the union); the union moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim.
- The Complaint alleges only that union Executive VP Terrence Richardson “had a duty to act and chose not to” after Fillmore filed a grievance following his suspension; it does not allege facts linking the union’s conduct to Fillmore’s age.
- The court considered pro se pleadings liberally and applicable pleading standards (Twombly/Iqbal), but found the union claim lacked any allegation of discriminatory animus or facts permitting an inference of age-based motivation.
- The court granted the union’s motion to dismiss but dismissed the union without prejudice, allowing Fillmore leave to amend because dismissal with prejudice was not warranted given potential for cure.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Fillmore stated an ADEA claim against the union for age discrimination by alleging breach of duty to represent | Fillmore contends Richardson failed to act on his grievance after his suspension, implying discriminatory treatment | Union argues the Complaint fails to plead facts showing breach motivated by age or any discriminatory animus | Dismissed: Complaint fails to allege discriminatory animus or facts permitting inference of age-based motive; claim dismissed without prejudice |
Key Cases Cited
- Brown v. Whole Foods Market, 789 F.3d 146 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (courts should consider facts alleged in all pro se pleadings when evaluating motions to dismiss)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (complaint must contain factual matter plausibly suggesting entitlement to relief)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard requires factual content allowing reasonable inference of defendant's liability)
- Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (plaintiff must plead facts from which inference of discrimination may be drawn)
- Belizan v. Hershon, 434 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (standard for dismissing with prejudice is high)
- Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (dismissal with prejudice only when no conceivable facts could cure pleading deficiencies)