Figueroa v. Garland, 119 F.4th 160

Jose Mauricio Figueroa, a native of El Salvador, sought special rule cancellation of removal under NACARA after DHS initiated proceedings for his removal.
Figueroa argued his removal would impose "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to himself and his spouse, Maria, who has lawful status in the U.S.
The immigration judge (IJ) found Figueroa had lived in the U.S. for 30 years, managed family property finances, and helped support his wife, who also works and has her own support system.
The IJ acknowledged both emotional and economic hardship to Figueroa and Maria but found them not to reach the required exceptional and extremely unusual level under NACARA; also noted Figueroa’s criminal history and failure to accept responsibility for past conduct.
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, applying established hardship case law and finding neither financial, emotional, nor country condition-based hardship sufficient.
Figueroa challenged the BIA's and IJ's application of the relevant hardship standard, and the First Circuit reviewed the denial.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Applicability and reviewability of the hardship standard	The agency misapplied the "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" standard to his case	The determination is factual and the standard was correctly applied	Court has jurisdiction to review application of the standard but finds no misapplication
Sufficiency of hardship to spouse Maria	Maria is dependent on Figueroa for financial and emotional support, constituting required hardship	Maria managed independently during Figueroa's absence and has her own support system	Agency correctly found hardship insufficient under the standard
Sufficiency of hardship to Figueroa himself	Figueroa faces danger and lack of medical care in El Salvador, citing family death	General country conditions and personal fears do not meet required hardship level	Agency’s conclusion upheld; hardship standard not met
Consideration of facts not directly found by IJ	Figueroa’s testimony on future hardship should be credited in absence of adverse credibility finding	Factual findings of the agency, not unsubstantiated testimony, control	Reviewing court is bound by agency findings; testimony alone insufficient

Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328 (2022) (limits judicial review of factual findings in discretionary-relief determinations)
Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209 (2024) (permits review of mixed questions—application of legal standards to facts—in removal contexts)
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (discusses limits and restoration of judicial review over constitutional claims and questions of law)
Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221 (2020) (clarifies reviewability of mixed questions involving application of law to facts)
In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56 (BIA 2001) (defines the scope of "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" standard for cancellation)
In re Andazola-Rivas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 319 (BIA 2002) (addresses types of hardships considered under cancellation statutes)
In re Gonzalez Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 467 (BIA 2002) (applies hardship standard in unique family circumstances)