Figueroa v. BNSF Railway Co.
361 Or. 142
| Or. | 2017Background
- Plaintiff (railroad employee) was injured in Washington while working on a BNSF locomotive and sued BNSF (a Delaware corporation with HQ in Texas) in Oregon state court.
- BNSF is a foreign corporation registered to do business in Oregon and had appointed a registered agent under ORS 60.731(1).
- BNSF moved to dismiss for lack of general personal jurisdiction; trial court denied the motion and the matter reached the Oregon Supreme Court by mandamus.
- Plaintiff argued (inter alia) that by appointing an Oregon registered agent under ORS 60.731(1) BNSF implicitly consented to general jurisdiction in Oregon.
- BNSF argued the registration statute only designates an agent for service of process, does not confer jurisdiction, and that treating registration as consent to general jurisdiction would raise constitutional concerns.
- The Oregon Supreme Court considered the statute’s text, context (including pre- and post-International Shoe law and the 1953 adoption of the Model Business Corporation Act), and legislative history and reserved any specific-jurisdiction analysis for the trial court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether appointing a registered agent under ORS 60.731(1) implies consent to general jurisdiction in Oregon | Appointment manifests implied consent to general jurisdiction (relying on early Oregon cases under the 1903 statute) | ORS 60.731(1) only designates a person for service of process and does not manifest consent to general jurisdiction | Held: No implied consent — ORS 60.731(1) designates an agent for service only and does not constitute consent to general jurisdiction |
| Whether prior Oregon cases construing the 1903 registration statute (e.g., Kahn) bind interpretation of ORS 60.731(1) | Prior cases show registration conferred general jurisdiction and thus control | 1953 Act reworded the statute and aligned domestic and foreign-agent rules, reflecting Model Act language and modern due-process law | Held: Kahn and similar 1903-era interpretations do not control the 1953 statute; the 1953 wording reflects a different intent |
| Whether the 1953 adoption of Model Business Corporation Act changed the effect of registration | (implicit) Registration should still provide jurisdictional consent | 1953 Act adopted Model Act language focused on service of process; same agent rule for domestic corporations undermines treating registration as consent | Held: 1953 Model-based statutory text and comments show the purpose is service, not jurisdictional consent |
| Whether treating registration as consent would be consistent with post-International Shoe due process doctrine | (implicit) older consent rationale can remain | Post-International Shoe jurisdiction rests on contacts; relying on registration to confer general jurisdiction is inconsistent with modern due-process analysis | Held: Statutory interpretation should conform to International Shoe framework; registration does not create independent jurisdictional basis |
Key Cases Cited
- Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (recognizes historical territorial limits of state personal jurisdiction)
- International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (establishes modern due-process test tying jurisdiction to defendant’s contacts with the forum)
- Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (distinguishes general and specific jurisdiction principles)
- Ramaswamy v. Hammond Lumber Co., 78 Or. 407 (1915 Oregon decision interpreting the 1903 registration statute)
- State ex rel. Kahn v. Tazwell, 125 Or. 528 (1928 Oregon decision holding registration under the 1903-era insurer statute supported jurisdiction over out-of-state claims)
- Barrett v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 361 Or. 115 (2017) (Oregon Supreme Court decision addressing general-jurisdiction issues under modern doctrine; controls related jurisdictional analysis in this case)