Fifteen-Thousand One-Hundred Ninety-Six Dollars and Forty-One Cents in United States Currency v. State
03-16-00015-CV
| Tex. App. | Nov 17, 2016Background
- The State filed a civil forfeiture action for $15,196.41 seized from Jaime Daryl Edwards, alleging the currency was contraband under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 59.01.
- Edwards, represented by counsel, timely filed a general denial; counsel later withdrew with Edwards’s agreement.
- The State moved to set a hearing on September 2, 2015; the trial court’s order setting the hearing was dated September 8 and mailed to Edwards at the county jail.
- The hearing was set for October 7, 2015; Edwards did not appear, the State presented evidence, and the court entered a default judgment forfeiting the funds to the State.
- Edwards filed a restricted appeal within six months, arguing the record shows he did not receive the 45 days’ notice required by Tex. R. Civ. P. 245 for a first trial setting; the record showed at most 29 days’ notice.
- The trial court’s judgment was reversed and remanded because the error (insufficient notice) was apparent on the face of the record.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Edwards) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the default judgment should be set aside because Edwards lacked the 45 days’ notice required by Rule 245 | Edwards argued the face of the record shows he received at most 29 days’ notice of the October 7 hearing, so the default judgment violated Rule 245 and due process | The State conceded the notice was less than 45 days but argued Edwards waived any complaint by failing to appear or object before trial or in post-judgment motions | Reversed and remanded: the record plainly showed insufficient notice (error apparent on the face of the record); waiver arguments did not cure the facial defect in a restricted appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- Alexander v. Lynda’s Boutique, 134 S.W.3d 845 (Tex. 2004) (elements and scope of restricted appeals)
- Ginn v. Forrester, 282 S.W.3d 430 (Tex. 2009) (error in restricted appeal must appear on the face of the record)
- General Elec. Co. v. Falcon Ridge Apartments, 811 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. 1991) (face of the record defined for restricted appeals)
- LBL Oil Co. v. International Power Servs., Inc., 777 S.W.2d 390 (Tex. 1989) (party who has appeared is entitled to notice of trial; failure to give notice can violate due process)
- Quaestor Invs., Inc. v. State of Chiapas, 997 S.W.2d 226 (Tex. 1999) (restricted-appeal standards)
- Norman Commc’ns, Inc. v. Texas Eastman Co., 955 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. 1997) (restricted-appeal standards)
- Blanco v. Bolanos, 20 S.W.3d 809 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000) (default judgment improper where party did not receive Rule 245’s 45 days’ notice)
- Balogh v. Ramos, 978 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1998) (party may be responsible for lack of notice when caused by its own failures; waiver principles)
- Custom-Crete, Inc. v. K-Bar Servs., Inc., 82 S.W.3d 655 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002) (a party who appears and is ready to proceed may waive a Rule 245 objection)
