332 Conn. 93
Conn.2019Background
- Junior volunteer firefighter James M. Smith spent ~3.5 hours at Old Saybrook Fire Company No. 1 monitoring the radio, then left in his personal car intending to go home for a personal errand; as he exited the firehouse driveway he collided with the plaintiff's motorcycle.
- Plaintiff sued Smith for negligence and sought to hold the fire company and the town vicariously liable under respondeat superior and statutes indemnifying volunteer firefighters and municipal employees.
- Municipal defendants moved for summary judgment arguing Smith was engaged in purely personal activity (going home) when the accident occurred and thus not acting within the scope of employment.
- Trial court ultimately granted summary judgment for the municipal defendants; the Appellate Court affirmed; the Supreme Court granted certification on whether an agency relationship existed at the time of the accident.
- The Supreme Court considered whether proximity to the firehouse or being "on call" (and thus ready to respond) sufficed to establish that Smith was acting for the employer's benefit and under employer control at the accident time.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Smith was acting within scope of employment when he left the firehouse and caused the collision | Smith was still "ready, willing and able" to respond and his proximity to the firehouse benefitted the fire company, supporting vicarious liability | Smith had embarked on a purely personal errand (going home); no control or benefit to employer at the time, so no vicarious liability | Held: Smith was pursuing purely personal affairs once he left; proximity/on-call status alone did not establish acting within scope; summary judgment for municipal defendants affirmed |
| Whether workers’ compensation scope ("fire duties") controls respondeat superior analysis | Plaintiff argued overlap; cited statutes and testimony suggesting on-call status could be within scope for WC purposes | Defendants argued WC scope and respondeat superior have different policies and standards; WC status alone insufficient for vicarious liability | Held: Even if WC coverage might apply, that does not compel a finding of scope for vicarious liability; different policies and tests apply |
| Whether being on or near employer premises when an accident occurs establishes employer control | Plaintiff relied on proximity and employer encouragement to be at the firehouse | Defendants argued mere presence or short response time does not show employer control or that employee was performing acts for employer benefit | Held: Employer control and an act for employer benefit (beyond mere availability) are required; proximity alone insufficient |
| Whether precedent (Levitz, Glucksman) dictates a factual dispute for jury | Plaintiff sought to distinguish Levitz and rely on Glucksman to create a triable issue | Defendants relied on Levitz as controlling and argued Glucksman is distinguishable because employee there actually performed an act benefitting employer | Held: Levitz controls; Glucksman is distinguishable (there the employee actually acted to benefit employer); no triable issue here |
Key Cases Cited
- Levitz v. Jewish Home for the Aged, Inc., 156 Conn. 193 (1968) (employee’s post‑work personal trip held not in furtherance of employer’s business; dispositive as a matter of law)
- Glucksman v. Walters, 38 Conn. App. 140 (1995) (App. Ct. reversed employer's directed verdict where employee actually engaged in conduct to maintain order that benefited employer)
- Wayman v. Accor North America, Inc., 45 Kan. App. 2d 526 (2011) (on‑call status alone does not make purely personal activity within scope of employment)
- Johnson v. Daily News, Inc., 34 N.Y.2d 33 (1974) (employer not vicariously liable absent a showing employee was performing an act for employer and employer exercised or could exercise control)