Feuston v. State
953 N.E.2d 545
| Ind. Ct. App. | 2011Background
- Feuston was charged in Jay County with class D felony theft and posted bond; he failed to appear for a May 5, 2009 pretrial conference, triggering a warrant.
- He was arrested in Delaware County for burglary (Aug. 16–18, 2009) and was detained there while Jay County proceedings stalled.
- Feuston filed a pro se Motion Requesting Final Disposition of Charges/Detainers on Aug. 17, 2010, contending Rule 4(C) discharged him after a year.
- Counsel was appointed, a jury trial was set for Oct. 21, 2010, and the trial court denied discharge on Oct. 13, 2010, certifying the matter for interlocutory appeal.
- The trial court determined the delay was caused by Feuston’s absconding, and that the Rule 4(C) clock did not restart without knowledge of his whereabouts by the court or State agents.
- The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that knowledge of the defendant’s whereabouts cannot be imputed to the court or prosecutor absent actual knowledge by those entities, and that Feuston failed to prove entitlement to discharge.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Feuston is entitled to discharge under Criminal Rule 4(C). | Feuston (State) argues delay must be charged to the State; he caused the delay. | Feuston contends the clock tolled due to absence and lack of timely action by the State. | No discharge; the clock was not tolled as the State lacked actual knowledge of his whereabouts until 2010. |
| Whether knowledge of whereabouts by other State agents tolls the clock. | State asserts only the court/prosecutor need knowledge to toll. | Feuston argues other agents’ knowledge should toll the clock. | Knowledge cannot be imputed to court/prosecutor absent their own knowledge; tolling requires their actual knowledge. |
| Whether absconding by Feuston tolls the Rule 4(C) clock. | State treats absconding as the defendant’s act that tolls delays. | Yes, the delay from May 5, 2009 to August 17, 2010 is Feuston’s fault, but tolling did not occur until knowledge existed. | |
| Did the record evidence support imputing Jay County knowledge of Delaware County incarceration? | Feuston argues Jay County had notice through jail communications. | Record insufficient to show Jay County knew Feuston was incarcerated in Delaware County before Aug. 17, 2010. |
Key Cases Cited
- Rust v. State, 792 N.E.2d 616 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (similar factual pattern on where delay rests and notice)
- Werner v. State, 818 N.E.2d 26 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (notice and tolling in multi-county delays; dissent on notice concerns)
- Johnson v. Kohlmeyer, 303 N.E.2d 663 (Ind.1973) (knowledge of authorities not imputed to court absent direct notice)
- Schwartz v. State, 708 N.E.2d 34 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (record silent on pretrial conference; State has burden to show timely trial; defendant not automatically charged for delay)
- Upshaw v. State, 934 N.E.2d 178 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (discusses standard of review for Rule 4(C) appeals)
- Caldwell v. State, 922 N.E.2d 1286 (Ind.Ct.App.2010) (purpose of Rule 4(C) to promote timely trials, not to discharge unnecessarily)