Ferris, Thompson and Zweig, Ltd. v. Esposito
2015 IL 117443
| Ill. | 2015Background
- Ferris, Thompson & Zweig (Ferris) sued attorney Anthony Esposito in Lake County circuit court for breach of referral/co‑counsel agreements seeking a share of attorney fees from two workers’ compensation claims after Esposito refused to pay the agreed percentages.
- The signed client agreements identified Ferris as contracted with Esposito to pursue the workers’ compensation claims and allocated responsibilities and a 45/55 fee split between firms; Esposito represented the claimants before the Commission and filed the claims.
- Esposito moved to dismiss under section 2‑619, arguing the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission (the Commission) has exclusive jurisdiction over all attorney‑fee disputes under section 16a(J) of the Workers’ Compensation Act.
- The circuit court denied the motion; following trial it entered judgment for Ferris for $4,965.25. The appellate court affirmed, holding the Commission’s fee jurisdiction does not extend to breaches of referral agreements between attorneys who did not both represent the claimant before the Commission.
- The Illinois Supreme Court granted leave, considered whether the legislature divested circuit courts of jurisdiction over this fee dispute, and affirmed the lower courts: the Commission’s statutory authority is limited to fees for representation before the Commission, not standalone referral‑agreement breaches.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over this attorney‑fee dispute under 820 ILCS 305/16a(J) | Ferris: The claim is a common‑law breach of a referral/co‑counsel agreement and thus properly in circuit court | Esposito: Section 16a(J) requires the Commission to hear any dispute about attorneys’ fees or fee contracts arising from workers’ compensation matters | Held: Circuit court has jurisdiction; 16a(J) is limited to fees for services performed representing claimants before the Commission, not independent referral‑agreement breaches |
| Whether referral agreements that allocate a percentage of Commission‑approved fees fall within the Commission’s fee‑apportionment authority | Ferris: Ferris only referred/assisted and did not represent claimants before the Commission; dispute concerns private contract rights | Esposito: Even referrals concern securing rights under the Act, so the Commission must decide division of fees | Held: Referral agreements alone do not invoke Commission authority absent services performed before the Commission |
| Whether Alvarado requires Commission jurisdiction here | Ferris: Alvarado concerned apportioning fees between attorneys who both represented the claimant before the Commission and is distinguishable | Esposito: Alvarado shows Commission may decide collateral fee disputes after final award | Held: Alvarado is consistent but limited to disputes involving attorneys who represented claimants before the Commission; it does not govern pure referral‑agreement breaches |
| Whether the legislature explicitly divested circuit courts of jurisdiction over such contract disputes | Ferris: No such explicit divestiture or comprehensive administrative scheme exists | Esposito: Statutory scheme broadly governs attorneys’ fees | Held: No explicit legislative divestiture; circuit courts retain jurisdiction over these common‑law contract claims |
Key Cases Cited
- Alvarado v. Industrial Comm’n, 216 Ill. 2d 547 (2005) (Commission may resolve collateral fee apportionment between attorneys who represented claimant before the Commission)
- Crossroads Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Sterling Truck Corp., 2011 IL 111611 (2011) (legislature must explicitly divest circuit courts of original jurisdiction via comprehensive administrative scheme)
- Patrick Engineering, Inc. v. City of Naperville, 2012 IL 113148 (2012) (standard for section 2‑619 motions and review de novo)
- Board of Education of the City of Chicago v. Industrial Comm’n, 93 Ill. 2d 1 (1982) (purpose of the Act is prompt and thorough compensation of claimants)