31 F.4th 878
4th Cir.2022Background:
- Trooper Michael Travelpiece obtained and executed a broad search warrant for Pristine Pre-Owned Autos, seizing business records, computers, a vehicle, and other materials.
- Prosecutors indicted co-owners Fernando M. Smith and Jamie Crabtree for allegedly selling salvage-title vehicles without disclosure; they were arraigned and released on recognizance bonds.
- Smith and Crabtree moved to suppress the seized evidence; four years after the search the state court suppressed all evidence, finding the warrant affidavit omitted material facts and contained misleading statements, and dismissed the charges with prejudice.
- Plaintiffs (Smith, Crabtree, and Pristine) sued Travelpiece under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 nearly five years after the search and about one year after dismissal; Travelpiece removed the case to federal court.
- The district court dismissed the § 1983 claim as time-barred under West Virginia’s two-year statute of limitations; the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding the claim accrued at the time of the unlawful search/seizure.
- The court treated the asserted violation as a Fourth Amendment unreasonable-search-and-seizure claim (not a Fourteenth Amendment due-process claim), analogized it to common-law trespass, and rejected applying a favorable-termination accrual rule.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When does a § 1983 claim for an unlawful search/seizure of property accrue? | Accrual should wait until charges are resolved (after dismissal), so suit here is timely. | Accrual occurs when the search/seizure occurs. | Accrual occurs at the time of the unlawful search/seizure; suit filed >2 years after search is time-barred. |
| Is the claim a Fourteenth Amendment due-process violation rather than a Fourth Amendment claim? | The affidavit lies and omissions deprived Plaintiffs of fair procedures, so a due-process claim accrues later. | The conduct falls squarely within Fourth Amendment unreasonable-search-and-seizure doctrine. | It is a Fourth Amendment claim; dressing it as due process does not transform it. |
| Should the favorable-termination (malicious-prosecution) accrual rule apply because the claim might impugn prosecution? | McDonough/Heck language requires favorable termination where claim "necessarily threatens to impugn" prosecution. | Wallace and common-law analogy control; favorable-termination applies only when analogous to malicious prosecution. | Rejected; favorable-termination rule does not apply to search/seizure claims analogized to trespass. |
| What common-law tort most closely analogizes to an unconstitutional search/seizure of property? | (Implicit) Accrual should be aligned with post-prosecution events. | Common-law trespass is the proper analogy, which accrues at the time of entry/seizure. | Trespass is the analogous tort; its accrual rule—accrual when entry/seizure occurs—applies. |
Key Cases Cited:
- Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (rejecting favorable-termination requirement for false-imprisonment–style claims)
- Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235 (state statute of limitations governs § 1983 timing)
- Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911 (identify precise constitutional violation to find common-law analog)
- McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149 (discussing favorable-termination when claim is analogous to malicious prosecution)
- Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (warrant affidavits containing deliberate falsehoods can violate Fourth Amendment)
- Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (favorable-termination bar for malicious-prosecution–type claims)
- United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (seizure occurs when meaningful interference with possessory interest happens)
- Cramer v. Crutchfield, 648 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1981) (Fourth Circuit rule that search/seizure § 1983 claims accrue at time of seizure)
- United States v. Colkley, 899 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1990) (application of Franks to warrant-affidavit falsities)