Fernandez v. Capra
916 F.3d 215
2d Cir.2019Background
- Pablo Fernandez was convicted in 1996 of murder-for-hire for the 1993 killing of Manny Quintero, based largely on testimony from two cooperators and four eyewitnesses who identified Fernandez.
- Investigator Officer Albert Melino reinvestigated the cold case in 1995 and helped secure photo-array and lineup identifications by eyewitnesses (Rosario brothers, Canela, Medina).
- Nine days after the verdict prosecutors disclosed that Melino had been arrested for pre‑NYPD narcotics sales (videotaped/recorded by state troopers); defense argued this was Brady impeachment material that was withheld during trial.
- Years after trial multiple eyewitnesses recanted: (1) the Rosario brothers (recantations considered not credible by the state court in 2003), and (2) Jesus Canela (recanted in 2010, claiming Melino coerced his ID). The state courts denied two successive new‑trial motions.
- Fernandez sought federal habeas under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; the district court denied relief under AEDPA. The Second Circuit affirmed denial as to the Brady claim and Rosario recantation but reversed as to Canela’s recantation, finding the state court’s disbelief of Canela an unreasonable factual determination and directing remediation.
Issues
| Issue | Fernandez's Argument | Respondents' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether prosecutors violated Brady by not disclosing Melino's pre‑NYPD drug conduct before verdict | Failure to disclose credible impeachment evidence about Melino violated Brady and was materially prejudicial | Disclosure duty not triggered until prosecutors confirmed tapes and arrested Melino after verdict; any nondisclosure was harmless given overwhelming case against Fernandez | Court: Duty arose Feb 6 (when prosecutors interviewed troopers) so state court unreasonably delayed finding on trigger, but denial was nonetheless reasonable on harmlessness grounds under Brady (no reversible prejudice) |
| Whether Rosario brothers’ recantations required a new trial (prosecutorial use of perjured testimony) | Recantations show identifications were coerced by Melino; prosecution knowingly used false testimony | State court found Hickliff’s recantation incredible (evasiveness, inconsistent statements) and denied new trial | Court: State court’s credibility determination on Hickliff was reasonable; no relief on Rosario-based claim |
| Whether Canela’s recantation required a new trial (prosecutorial use of perjured testimony) | Canela later admitted he falsely identified Fernandez due to police pressure; if credited, his perjury was material and the prosecution knew or should have known | State court found Canela not credible (demeanor, delay in recanting, trial testimony detail) and denied new trial | Court: State court’s rejection of Canela’s recantation was an unreasonable determination of the facts under §2254(d); Canela’s recantation is sufficiently credible and material to require a new trial unless state retries within ordered period |
| Application of AEDPA deference to state-court factual/constitutional rulings | State rulings unreasonably applied federal law or were unreasonable factual findings warranting habeas relief | AEDPA requires deference; federal court may not overturn reasonable state-court decisions | Court: Applied AEDPA; affirmed state rulings where reasonable (Brady harmlessness; Rosario), reversed where state factual finding was objectively unreasonable (Canela) |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263 (Brady three‑part test for suppressed impeachment/exculpatory evidence)
- United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (prosecution need not disclose preliminary or speculative information)
- United States v. Cromitie, 727 F.3d 194 (elements for new trial based on perjured testimony)
- United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445 (knowing use of false testimony mandates reversal)
- DiSimone v. Phillips, 461 F.3d 181 (defendant/counsel—not prosecutor—may decide how to use impeachment evidence)
- In re Payne, 707 F.3d 195 (deference to trial-court demeanor findings can be limited when judge did not observe original trial testimony)
- Kampshoff v. Smith, 698 F.2d 581 (eyewitness testimony is highly influential though often unreliable)
- Josephberg v. United States, 562 F.3d 478 (framework for prosecutorial knowledge and use of perjured testimony)