Fermin Valenzuela v. City of Anaheim
29 F.4th 1093
9th Cir.2022Background
- Facts/procedure: A divided Ninth Circuit panel had affirmed jury awards that included post‑death “hedonic” (loss‑of‑life) damages to the family and estate of Fermin Valenzuela, Jr., who died after a police encounter. Defendants sought panel rehearing and rehearing en banc; those petitions were denied. Judge Bea filed a statement respecting the denial of rehearing en banc; Judge Collins concurred in parts and dissented from the denial.
- Relief at trial: The juries awarded substantial sums for pre‑death pain and suffering, wrongful death, and separate post‑death “hedonic” loss‑of‑life awards (the hedonic awards duplicated wrongful‑death sums in the cases discussed).
- Central legal conflict: Whether California’s statutory prohibition on post‑death hedonic damages is inconsistent with the remedial goals of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 such that federal courts must allow such awards under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
- Panel precedent vs. en banc argument: The earlier panel (affirming hedonic awards) held the CA ban inconsistent with § 1983; Judge Bea argued that holding conflicts with Supreme Court precedent and existing common‑law principles and that the Ninth Circuit should have reheard the cases en banc.
- Policy and evidentiary disputes: Judge Bea contends (1) Robertson v. Wegmann controls and forecloses treating a state ban on a category of damages as inconsistent with § 1983; (2) deterrence arguments (that banning hedonic damages incentivizes killing) are speculative and rejected by Robertson; and (3) hedonic damages are speculative, hard to quantify, and contrary to common‑law tort principles.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether California’s ban on post‑death hedonic damages is inconsistent with § 1983 (via § 1988) | Valenzuela: CA prohibition undermines § 1983’s compensation and deterrence goals and thus is inconsistent; federal law should permit hedonic awards | City of Anaheim / Judge Bea: Robertson forecloses treating a state rule limiting or abating recovery as per se inconsistent; CA law provides multiple substantial remedies (pre‑death pain, wrongful death, consortium) | Judge Bea: CA ban is consistent with § 1983 under Robertson and should not have been rejected en banc (but rehearing was denied and panel decision stands) |
| Whether the deterrence rationale (that banning hedonic damages makes it more economical to kill) justifies creating hedonic awards | Valenzuela: Without hedonic damages, officers may be incentivized to kill rather than injure | City: The deterrence theory is implausible (officers don’t calculate victims’ family status or future damages in the field); wrongful‑death and pre‑death awards produce equal or larger total exposure | Judge Bea: Robertson and precedent reject the speculative deterrence argument; CA awards are often large enough to deter misconduct |
| Whether § 1988 authorizes federal courts to create damage remedies (federal common‑law damages) when state law does not provide them | Valenzuela panel: § 1988 permits applying federal remedial policies to supply damages inconsistent with state limits | City / Bea: § 1988 requires applying state common law (as modified by state statutes) unless inconsistent; there is no federal statute or Supreme Court authority authorizing creation of a new post‑death hedonic remedy | Judge Bea: The panel misapplied § 1988; federal courts should follow state common law unless clearly inconsistent with federal law, which Robertson shows is not the case here |
| Whether post‑death hedonic damages are administrable and consistent with tort law principles | Valenzuela: Hedonic damages compensate a real loss (life’s pleasures) and serve § 1983’s goals; expert methods can quantify value | City / Bea: Hedonic measures are speculative, often inadmissible under Daubert; awards do not compensate the victim (estate distribution, creditors), and conflict with common‑law rule that personal actions die with the person | Judge Bea: Hedonic awards are speculative, contravene tort rules (cognitive‑awareness and certainty), and therefore are inappropriate to impose over state law prohibitions |
Key Cases Cited
- Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978) (held state survivorship/abatement rules are not automatically inconsistent with § 1983; federal courts must not override state survivorship rules absent clear conflict)
- Frontier Ins. Co. v. Blaty, 454 F.3d 590 (6th Cir. 2006) (applied Robertson to uphold a prohibition on post‑death hedonic damages as consistent with § 1983)
- Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984) (reached opposite view, holding a ban on hedonic damages inconsistent with § 1983 because of perverse incentives)
- Chaudhry v. City of Los Angeles, 751 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2014) (recognized availability of pre‑death pain and suffering in § 1983 survival actions under California law)
- Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (common‑law tort rules supply starting point for § 1983 damages analysis)
- Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986) (police use‑of‑force decisions made in haste; courts should not assume detached economic calculations by officers)
- Mercado v. Ahmed, 974 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirmed district court’s exclusion of hedonic damages expert testimony as unreliable)
- Huff v. Tracey, 57 Cal. App. 3d 939 (1976) (California allows hedonic evidence for living plaintiffs but state law bars post‑death hedonic recovery)
- Garcia v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 4th 177 (1996) (California appellate court held prohibition on post‑death hedonic damages not inconsistent with § 1983 given other remedies)
- Loth v. Truck‑A‑Way Corp., 60 Cal. App. 4th 757 (1997) (criticized baseline hedonic valuation methods as unrelated to the particular decedent)