FERMIN RECALDE v. THE STATE OF FLORIDA, 18-1981

Background

Recalde stabbed his girlfriend, Dora Rial; two deep chest wounds proved fatal and DNA/blood evidence linked him to the scene; he later confessed and sought help at the police station.
He was tried twice; second trial resulted in a first-degree murder conviction and life without parole; direct appeal affirmed.
Recalde filed a timely Rule 3.850 postconviction motion alleging, among 21 claims, that trial counsel conceded guilt to manslaughter in closing without his consent, asserting a McCoy-type structural violation.
An evidentiary hearing was held on two claims; counsel testified she discussed and recommended an accident/manslaughter theory as the best tactical defense and that Recalde acquiesced; Recalde testified he had insisted the killing was accidental and denied consenting to any guilt concession.
The trial court credited counsel’s testimony, found the concession a reasonable strategic choice, denied relief; the district court affirmed, concluding this was not a McCoy claim but a failure-to-consult allegation resolved against Recalde on credibility and legal grounds.

Issues

Issue	Recalde's Argument	State/Trial Court's Argument	Held
Whether counsel’s closing concession of manslaughter without express consent is a McCoy structural violation	Counsel conceded guilt without Recalde’s consent; this overrides defendant’s autonomy to insist on innocence => structural error	Counsel discussed and obtained Recalde’s acquiescence; concession was tactical to avoid first-degree murder conviction	Denied — not McCoy: no express, intransigent objection; court credited counsel’s testimony
Whether failure to consult alone triggers McCoy protections	Recalde: failure to consult is equivalent to conceding over objection and requires per se reversal	State: mere failure to consult is not McCoy; McCoy requires an express, unambiguous insistence on innocence and an override	Denied — failure-to-consult is not McCoy; court treated it as an ineffective-assistance/credibility issue
Whether Nixon/Cronic/Strickland prejudice analysis applies when defendant did not expressly object	Recalde: Nixon/Cronic protect autonomy; prejudice analysis not required if counsel effectively conceded guilt without consent	State: Nixon allows counsel to proceed if strategy was adequately discussed; absent express objection, Strickland review controls and no presumptive prejudice	Denied — court applied Strickland/Nixon principles; no automatic reversal because counsel disclosed strategy and court credited her testimony
Whether the trial court’s credibility finding can be disturbed on appeal	Recalde: trial court should not have believed counsel over him about consultation/acquiescence	State: appellate court must defer to trial court on witness credibility and factual findings supported by competent, substantial evidence	Affirmed — appellate court defers to trial court credibility findings; evidence supports denial

Key Cases Cited

McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018) (defendant has right to insist on objective of asserting innocence; counsel may not concede guilt over express objection; such error is structural)
Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004) (where counsel adequately discloses and discusses concession strategy and defendant neither objects nor expressly consents, no presumptive prejudice)
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (recognized circumstances warranting presumption of prejudice where counsel wholly fails to function as adversary)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong ineffective-assistance test: deficient performance and prejudice)
Atwater v. State, 788 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 2001) (concession to lesser-included offense without express objection did not necessarily violate Sixth Amendment where meaningful adversarial testing occurred)
Harvey v. State, 318 So. 3d 1238 (Fla. 2021) (failure to consult with defendant before conceding guilt is not a McCoy structural claim)