Ferguson v. Stokes, 756 S.E.2d 455

Ferguson obtained a permit (1955) and later quitclaimed to an island and causeway in the Rappahannock River; Commonwealth owned underlying bottomlands.
Bozeman acquired adjacent shoreline property and riparian rights (1977); later sued Ferguson (2006) for interfering with riparian rights; parties settled with Ferguson agreeing to buy Bozeman’s shoreline and mutual releases.
Ferguson defaulted; court later (2010 order) held Bozeman (plaintiffs) owned the shoreline and riparian rights, Ferguson owned no shoreline or riparian rights, and the Commonwealth owned the bottomlands.
Plaintiffs sued ejectment to remove Ferguson’s oyster house located on the island; Ferguson pleaded the statute of limitations and sought to rely on Code § 28.2-1200.1(B)(2) (added 2011) to claim title to bottomlands.
Trial court dismissed Ferguson’s statute-of-limitations plea as waived by the settlement, rejected his § 28.2-1200.1(B)(2) defense (procedural and substantive grounds), held Bozeman’s riparian rights were vested by the 2010 order, treated the oyster house as a fixture, and ordered Ferguson to vacate.
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed: settlement barred adverse-possession/statute-of-limitations defense; vesting protected riparian rights from the 2011 statutory change; oyster house was a fixture.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Ferguson's plea in bar (statute of limitations) bars ejectment	Settlement released all past claims; ejectment may proceed	Statute of limitations bars ejectment and effectively conveys title by adverse possession	Affirmed: plea barred by mutual release; it was equivalent to waived adverse-possession claim
Whether Ferguson may invoke Code § 28.2-1200.1(B)(2) to claim bottomlands/title	§ 28.2-1200.1(B)(2) does not apply because plaintiffs’ riparian rights vested before statute	§ 28.2-1200.1(B)(2) grants title/rights to person in Ferguson’s position	Affirmed: court also found § 28.2-1200.1(B)(2) inapplicable because riparian rights were vested pre-enactment; alternative bases unchallenged on appeal support affirmance
Whether Ferguson procedurally preserved § 28.2-1200.1(B)(2) defense	N/A (plaintiffs contend defense was not pled)	Ferguson argued statute was available at trial to assert title	Court held defense was procedurally barred and substantively insufficient (also relied on vested-rights ground)
Whether the oyster house is removable personalty or a fixture	Plaintiffs: oyster house is part of realty and within riparian zone, so ejectment applies	Ferguson: oyster house is personal property and may be removed	Affirmed: oyster house is a fixture (annexation, adaptation, permanent intent); directed Ferguson to vacate

McClanahan v. Norfolk W. Ry. Co., 122 Va. 705 (1918) (statute of limitations for ejectment and adverse possession are functionally linked and can vest title in adverse occupant)
Mulford v. Walnut Hill Farm Grp., LLC, 282 Va. 98 (2011) (standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact)
Danville Holding Corp. v. Clement, 178 Va. 223 (1941) (three-factor fixture test: annexation, adaptation, owner’s intent)
Gloucester Realty Corp. v. Guthrie, 182 Va. 869 (1944) (statutes are not construed to impair vested rights absent express declaration)
Manchester Oaks Homeowners Ass’n v. Batt, 284 Va. 409 (2012) (appellant must assign error to each independent basis supporting lower court’s ruling)
Thomas v. Jones, 69 Va. (1877) (recognition that statutes of limitations can effectuate vesting in adverse occupant)