Fennell v. Marion Independent School District
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 17798
| 5th Cir. | 2015Background
- Plaintiffs (African‑American mother and her children) alleged pervasive student‑on‑student racial harassment in Marion Independent School District, including repeated racial epithets, a noose and a racist note left by a student’s car, racially derogatory teacher/coach comments, and other incidents over several years.
- After the parking‑lot noose, school administrators involved police and FBI, provided accommodations (e.g., counselor office, teacher parking, escorts), and instituted DOJ‑facilitated training and a student assembly; plaintiffs later withdrew two daughters from the district.
- Plaintiffs sued under Title VI (against Marion ISD) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Equal Protection (against Marion ISD and two employees, Manley and Davis in their individual capacities).
- The district court granted summary judgment to defendants; plaintiffs appealed. The Fifth Circuit reviewed de novo.
- The court applied the Davis deliberate‑indifference framework (from Title IX) to Title VI student‑on‑student harassment claims and considered whether harassment was (1) severe/pervasive/objectively offensive and (2) met the deliberate‑indifference standard.
- The Fifth Circuit affirmed: it found a triable issue that a racially hostile environment existed, but concluded plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine dispute that the district was deliberately indifferent or that individual defendants acted with actionable discriminatory intent.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Title VI liability attaches for student‑on‑student racial harassment | Marion ISD created a racially hostile environment depriving students of educational benefits | District argued harassment was episodic/insufficiently pervasive | Court: Apply Davis deliberate‑indifference test; harassment here could be severe/pervasive (triable dispute) |
| Whether Marion ISD was deliberately indifferent (Title VI) | District’s responses were weak or ineffective (e.g., mild punishments, inconsistent discipline) | District responded to most incidents, cooperated with investigations, provided accommodations and training; responses not clearly unreasonable | Court: No genuine dispute of deliberate indifference; summary judgment affirmed for Title VI |
| Monell municipal liability under § 1983 (customs/policies or failure to train) | Board condoned or was deliberately indifferent to discriminatory customs/failure to train | Board lacked final policymaker knowledge before May 2012; policies against discrimination existed and DOJ training occurred | Court: No evidence Board with final policymaking authority had notice such that a custom/failure‑to‑train claim survives; summary judgment affirmed |
| Individual equal‑protection claims against Manley and Davis | Manley and Davis treated plaintiffs differently because of race in specific incidents (bus/softball incidents; hair comment) | Actions were nondiscriminatory or neutral enforcement of rules; no similarly situated comparators; no proof of race‑based intent | Court: No genuine dispute of discriminatory intent or disparate treatment; summary judgment affirmed for both individuals |
Key Cases Cited
- Davis ex rel. Lashonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (school deliberate‑indifference standard for peer harassment)
- Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.C., 436 U.S. 658 (municipal liability requires policy/custom and policymaker authority)
- Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022 (discussing hostile‑environment framework for student racial harassment)
- Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 101 F.3d 393 (Title VI requires discriminatory intent for damages)
- Sanches v. Carrollton‑Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 647 F.3d 156 (Fifth Circuit on deliberate‑indifference standard in school harassment context)
- Cuadra v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 626 F.3d 808 (summary‑judgment standard and view of evidence)
- Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567 (municipal custom and isolated acts doctrine)
- Priester v. Lowndes Cty., 354 F.3d 414 (equal‑protection proof: similarly situated + discriminatory intent)