Felix Flores v. State
04-15-00172-CR
| Tex. App. | Jul 22, 2015Background
- Felix Flores was indicted for three counts of aggravated robbery with a deadly-weapon finding; first trial ended in mistrial and a second trial convicted him on all counts and judge sentenced him to 25 years.
- During voir dire the trial judge told veniremembers they had an "absolute right to disagree with the law" and repeated that jurors could disagree with the Constitution and law as citizens.
- Neither party objected at voir dire; in the court’s final charge jurors were also told they were "bound to receive the law from the Court" — a possibly conflicting message.
- During the trial a seated juror (identified as Juror 25) informed the court privately that he used to be a neighbor of the defendant; the juror said that knowledge "should not" affect him and affirmed he could decide based only on trial evidence.
- Defense counsel objected after the colloquy and requested further inquiry or removal; the court allowed the juror to remain after accepting his assurance; defense noted an exception and later appealed.
- Appellant raises two constitutional claims on appeal: (1) the judge’s voir dire statement improperly encouraged jurors to disregard the law and created confusion; (2) the court erred by refusing further inquiry of Juror 25, preventing an informed challenge for cause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Flores) | Held / Posture |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial judge’s voir dire statement that jurors have a right to "disagree with the law" infected jury impartiality | No contemporaneous objection at voir dire; the court’s final charge correctly instructed jurors to follow the law, and any error (if raised) is harmless | The judge’s unqualified voir dire comment, unclarified and in tension with the final charge, permitted juror caprice about obeying the law and denied an impartial jury (constitutional error) | Raised on appeal by Flores; appellant seeks reversal for constitutional error (appellate ruling not included in this brief) |
| Whether the court erred by declining further inquiry of Juror 25 after he disclosed a prior neighbor relationship | Knowledge of a party or witness alone does not automatically disqualify a juror; court accepted juror’s statement of impartiality | Defense was entitled to further questioning to assess equivocal answer and intelligently exercise challenges (per Franklin line of cases); denial prevented meaningful challenge for cause | Raised on appeal by Flores; appellant seeks reversal for constitutional error (appellate ruling not included in this brief) |
Key Cases Cited
- Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (U.S. 1967) (constitutional error requires harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Anderson v. State, 633 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (mere juror knowledge of a party or victim is not automatically disqualifying)
- Feldman v. State, 70 S.W.3d 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (a juror biased against a phase of the law is challengeable for cause)
- Threadgill v. State, 146 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (prospective juror must be able to follow law despite personal views)
- Franklin v. State, 138 S.W.3d 351 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (trial court’s refusal to permit further inquiry into juror impartiality can present constitutional error)