Felix A. Smith v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections
691 F. App'x 555
| 11th Cir. | 2017Background
- In 1995 Smith was convicted in Florida of robbery with a firearm and sentenced to 30 years imprisonment plus 10 years of Drug Offender Probation.
- Smith filed a § 2254 petition in 2000 that was dismissed as untimely; the dismissal was affirmed on appeal.
- In 2013 a Florida court vacated the Drug Offender Probation as unlawful and resentenced Smith, converting that term to standard probation with specific conditions.
- In July 2015 Smith filed a pro se § 2254 petition raising four claims challenging aspects of his original criminal proceedings and sentence.
- The district court dismissed the 2015 petition as second or successive because the claims related to errors in the original trial and, it held, should have been raised in the first petition.
- The Eleventh Circuit concluded the 2013 resentencing produced a new judgment, so the 2015 petition was not "second or successive," vacated the dismissal, and remanded for further proceedings (including timeliness).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 2015 § 2254 petition is "second or successive" | Smith contends his 2015 petition challenges the new judgment created by the 2013 resentencing and is therefore not successive | State contends petition is successive because claims attack errors from the original trial that should have been in the first petition | The resentencing created a new judgment; the 2015 petition is not "second or successive" |
| Whether district court had jurisdiction to consider the petition without COA from the court of appeals | Smith argues no prior authorization required because he challenges the new judgment | State argues authorization still required because claims arise from the original conviction | Court holds authorization not required when petition challenges a new judgment arising from resentencing |
| Whether claims tied only to the original trial affect the "second or successive" analysis | Smith argues the substance of claims is immaterial once a new judgment exists | State argues substance matters and renders petition successive | Court holds substance is immaterial for the successive inquiry if there is a new judgment |
| Whether dismissal on other grounds (timeliness) is appropriate | Smith asserts his petition should proceed and timeliness must be judged on remand | State asserts petition is untimely and dismissal can be affirmed on that ground | Court declines to decide timeliness (insufficient record) and remands for determination |
Key Cases Cited
- Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010) (an "application" is assessed against the judgment challenged; an application attacking a new judgment is not second or successive)
- Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147 (2007) (district court lacks jurisdiction to consider second-or-successive petition filed without circuit authorization)
- Insignares v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 755 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2014) (a judgment includes both conviction and sentence; resentencing creates a new judgment for AEDPA purposes)