605 U.S. 38
SCOTUS2025Background
- Nick Feliciano, a federal air traffic controller and Coast Guard reservist, was called to active duty from 2012-2017 under 10 U.S.C. §12301(d).
- His orders occurred while national emergencies declared by the President were ongoing.
- Feliciano did not receive "differential pay"—the statutory government make-up for pay lost when federal employees serve on active military duty at lower pay rates.
- Feliciano claimed under 5 U.S.C. §5538(a) (which incorporates 10 U.S.C. §101(a)(13)(B)) that he was entitled to differential pay because he served on active duty under another "provision of law" during a national emergency.
- The Merit Systems Protection Board and Federal Circuit denied relief, holding he needed a "substantive connection" between his service and a particular declared emergency, not just temporal overlap.
Issues
| Issue | Feliciano's Argument | DOT's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does "during a national emergency" require only that active duty occurs while a national emergency declaration is ongoing, or also a substantive connection to the emergency? | Only temporal overlap is needed; orders during any national emergency suffice for differential pay. | Must show service's substantive connection to the national emergency; mere contemporaneity is insufficient. | Only temporal overlap is required; differential pay is owed if federal reserve service happens during declared emergency, without showing substantive connection. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321 (statements in syllabus are not Court opinion)
- United States v. Ressam, 553 U.S. 272 ("during" generally denotes temporal, not substantive, connection)
- Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 596 U.S. 685 (contextual cues in statutory construction)
- Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582 U.S. 79 (ordinary meaning controls unless Congress provides otherwise)
- Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 593 U.S. 155 (courts should not speculate about hidden statutory meanings)
- Department of Agriculture Rural Development Rural Housing Service v. Kirtz, 601 U.S. 42 (definition versus ordinary meaning in statutes)
- Sekhar v. United States, 570 U.S. 729 (statutory terms may be specialized in context)
- Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844 (relevance of ordinary meaning alongside statutory definitions)
- Home Depot U. S. A., Inc. v. Jackson, 587 U.S. 435 (statutory terms must be read in context)
- TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (superfluity canon in statutory interpretation)
- Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497 (courts must enforce statutes as written regardless of policy)
- Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328 (policy concerns cannot override text)