331 Conn. 436
Conn.2019Background
- November 6, 2018 election for Connecticut House 120th district: approx. 76 voters at Bunnell High School received 122nd-district ballots by mistake and could not vote for 120th district state representative.
- Initial tally and statutory recanvass produced a very narrow margin: Phillip Young (Dem) led Jim Feehan (Rep) by 18 then 13 votes; Feehan sued on November 15 seeking declaratory relief, a new election, and injunctions; he later added 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims (due process/equal protection).
- Feehan sought a temporary injunction preventing the Secretary of the State and other statewide canvassers from canvassing and declaring the winner; Young intervened and (with state defendants) moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Connecticut’s elections clause (Conn. Const. art. III, § 7).
- Trial court: dismissed parts of Feehan’s complaint as barred by the elections clause but granted a temporary injunction preventing canvass/declaration to preserve status quo; parties appealed under expedited § 52-265a procedure.
- Supreme Court of Connecticut: held the elections clause vests exclusive authority over legislative election contests in the House of Representatives; General Statutes § 9-328 (municipal contests) did not authorize court jurisdiction here; Feehan’s § 1983 claims failed on the pleadings for lack of alleged intentional state action; the temporary injunction was vacated and dismissal directed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Conn. Const. art. III, § 7 (elections clause) divests state courts of jurisdiction over this legislative election dispute | Feehan: clause only makes each house final judge of returns/tally, not procedural irregularities; courts can remedy unconstitutional administration (seek new election) | Young/State: clause gives the House exclusive jurisdiction over contests involving its members; judicial interference would be unprecedented and constitutionally barred | Held: elections clause gives the House exclusive jurisdiction over legislative election contests; courts lack jurisdiction to order a new election or enjoin canvass in this dispute |
| Whether General Statutes § 9-328 (municipal election contests) confers jurisdiction here | Feehan: § 9-328’s broad language and the definition of "municipal office" could encompass single-town assembly districts like the 120th | Defendants: statutory scheme limits § 9-328 to municipal offices under § 9-1 definitions; § 9-372 definitions apply only to specific chapters and not to § 9-328; reading otherwise yields absurd distinctions among districts | Held: § 9-328 does not apply to state legislative offices; the 120th district seat is not a "municipal office" for § 9-328 purposes, so no jurisdiction under that statute |
| Whether federal supremacy (and § 1983) removes state constitutional jurisdictional bar so state courts can hear federal constitutional claims | Feehan: supremacy clause prevents state constitutional provisions (elections clause) from blocking federal claims; courts must be able to adjudicate § 1983 claims alleging denial of voting rights | Defendants: federalism limits federal review of state election administration; Second Circuit precedent requires intentional state action to state a § 1983 due process/equal protection claim in election context | Held: even assuming supremacy could overcome the elections clause, Feehan failed to plead intentional or discriminatory state action; his allegations describe an unintentional administrative mistake, not a constitutional violation, so federal claims fail on the pleadings |
| Whether the trial court’s temporary injunction barring canvass/declaration was proper and whether appeals challenging it are moot after statutory canvass deadline | Defendants: trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue injunction; appeal not moot because constitutional/constitutional-duties to canvass survive statutory timing and equitable remedies (nunc pro tunc) may apply | Feehan: appeals moot because statutory deadline (§ 9-319) passed, so reversing injunction cannot restore canvass in the same month | Held: appeals are not moot; but because the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the underlying dispute, its injunction was vacated and dismissal directed |
Key Cases Cited
- Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972) (upheld state recount procedures for federal elections so long as Congress/House/Senate retain ultimate judging power)
- Morgan v. United States, 801 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (elections clause precludes judicial review of House determinations; legislative body is exclusive judge)
- State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672 (1992) (framework for interpreting state constitutional provisions; Geisler factors applied)
- Shannon v. Jacobowitz, 394 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2005) (in election cases, federal due process/equal protection claims require intentional state action; ordinary administrative errors are insufficient)
- Powell v. Power, 436 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1970) (due process claim denied where errors in election administration do not establish intentional state deprivation)
- Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (equal protection concerns where varying standards across jurisdictions affected recounts)
- McIntyre v. Wick, 558 N.W.2d 347 (S.D. 1996) (distinguishes ministerial recount procedures from nonjudicial legislative contests; courts may supervise recounts but cannot decide final legislative contests)