Federal National Mortgage Association v. Rego
50 N.E.3d 419
Mass.2016Background
- The Regos owned a Billerica home subject to a mortgage that was ultimately assigned to GMAC, which conducted a foreclosure sale in May 2011; GMAC was the high bidder and later assigned the bid to Fannie Mae.
- Orlans Moran, GMAC's law firm, sent and published foreclosure notices and signed related documents as "By its Attorneys, Orlans Moran PLLC."
- The Regos sought a negotiated payoff and loan modification shortly before the sale; GMAC initially paused review but denied the request and completed the sale.
- Fannie Mae, the foreclosing purchaser, sued in Housing Court in a summary process action to obtain possession after recording the foreclosure deed and affidavit of sale.
- The Regos defended, alleging (1) the foreclosure was void because GMAC’s attorneys lacked written authorization under G. L. c. 244, § 14, and (2) claims under G. L. c. 93A for unfair or deceptive mortgage and modification-related practices.
- The Housing Court granted Fannie Mae summary judgment "as to possession only," scheduled trial on the 93A counterclaims, then dismissed those counterclaims for lack of jurisdiction; the SJC reversed and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 14 requires a mortgagee to give prior written authorization to its legal counsel before counsel may publish and mail notices or otherwise perform acts under the power of sale | Fannie Mae: counsel may act on mortgagee's behalf as a "person acting in the name of such mortgagee" without a separate prior power-of-attorney writing | Regos: § 14’s phrase "attorney duly authorized by a writing under seal" requires a power of attorney (writing) authorizing counsel to perform statutory acts; absent that, foreclosure is void | The phrase refers to an "attorney in fact" (agent under a power of attorney); it does not mean ordinary legal counsel. Counsel may act as "person acting in the name of such mortgagee," so no defect in foreclosure on this ground |
| Whether the affidavit of sale complied with § 15’s written-authorization requirement (assuming such a requirement exists) | Fannie Mae: even if § 15 required written authorization, GMAC provided written authorization to its counsel on Nov 28, 2011, before the affidavit was signed and recorded | Regos: the affidavit was signed/recorded without the required written authorization, making the prima facie case defective | Assuming § 15 requires written authorization, the record shows GMAC gave written authorization on Nov 28, 2011; affidavit of sale thus supports a prima facie case |
| Whether the Housing Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate G. L. c. 93A counterclaims in a postforeclosure summary process action | Fannie Mae: once possession is decided for the plaintiff, the Housing Court lacks jurisdiction to proceed on 93A claims seeking relief tied to possession | Regos: 93A claims and equitable defenses can challenge the foreclosure and, if successful, could vitiate title or possession; Housing Court should hear them | Housing Court has broad jurisdiction over housing-related claims including 93A; counterclaims that affect right to possession must be resolved in summary process; counterclaims that do not may be severed and adjudicated separately. The dismissal here was improper without clarifying whether counterclaims affected possession |
Key Cases Cited
- U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Ibanez, 458 Mass. 637 (recognizing strict statutory requirements for statutory power-of-sale foreclosures)
- Bank of N.Y. v. Bailey, 460 Mass. 327 (summary process defendant may challenge compliance with power-of-sale to vindicate possession)
- Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n v. Hendricks, 463 Mass. 635 (describing prima facie showing where affidavit of sale meets § 15 requirements)
- Eaton v. Federal Nat'l Mtge. Ass'n, 462 Mass. 569 (explaining statutory power of sale under G. L. c. 183, § 21)
- Bank of Am., N.A. v. Rosa, 466 Mass. 613 (discussing Housing Court jurisdiction to resolve claims that could vitiate title or possession)
- Cranston v. Crane, 97 Mass. 459 (establishing that a mortgagee may delegate power-of-sale acts without a sealed power of attorney)
