Federal Election Commission v. Craig for U.S. Senate
933 F. Supp. 2d 111
D.D.C.2013Background
- FEC sued Craig for U.S. Senate, his committee, and treasurer alleging use of campaign funds to pay legal expenses for withdrawing a guilty plea, constituting unlawful personal use under 2 U.S.C. § 439a(b).
- Defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing expenditures were expressly permitted under § 439a(a)(2) and that reliance on FEC advisory opinions immunized them.
- Plaintiff contends the legal fees were not ordinary and necessary in connection with duties as officeholder and would not have existed but for the offense and campaign; funds were converted to personal use.
- Criminal conduct: Craig arrested June 11, 2007 in airport restroom, pled guilty to disorderly conduct on Aug. 8, 2007; sought to withdraw plea later that year; committee incurred over $480,000 in legal fees and expenses.
- Ethics inquiry and public admonition by Senate Ethics Committee in 2008 acknowledged some expenditures may not be in connection with official duties.
- Kolbe for Congress advisory opinion discussed as a potentially controlling authority, but the court distinguishes Kolbe and other advisory opinions as not controlling given factual differences.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Craig funds were lawfully used under § 439a(a)(2). | FEC contends expenses were ordinary and necessary in connection with duties as officeholder. | Defendants argue expenses were permitted under § 439a(a)(2) because related to official duties. | No; expenditures not ordinary and necessary in connection with duties. |
| Whether the Craig expenditures were prohibited personal use under § 439a(b). | Funds were converted to personal use because the legal fees would exist irrespective of office. | Expenses were not personal; they were connected to campaign/officeholder activities. | Yes; the funds were personal use under § 439a(b). |
| Whether the defendants are immune from suit based on reliance on FEC advisory opinions. | Immunity does not apply because opinions relied upon are distinguishable or wrongly applied. | Reliance on Kolbe and other opinions should shield them under § 437f(c)(1)(B). | No immunity; opinions are distinguishable and do not immunize. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (plausibility standard for pleading; allows only plausible claims)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (two-prong approach to surviving Rule 12(b)(6): plausibility and non-conclusory facts)
- Kowal v. MCI Commc'ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (liberal pleading standard; plaintiff entitled to inferences)
- Gustave-Schmidt v. Chao, 226 F. Supp. 2d 191 (D.D.C. 2002) (judicial notice and scope of pleadings in Rule 12(b)(6) context)
- Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (limits on inferences in evaluating complaint allegations)