596 U.S. 289
SCOTUS2022Background
- Ted Cruz loaned $260,000 to his 2018 Senate campaign; campaign debts may be repaid with post-election contributions but BCRA §304 bars using more than $250,000 of post‑election funds to repay candidate loans.
- FEC regulations implement §304 by allowing up to $250,000 to be repaid from contributions "at any time," but (via a 20‑day rule) require repayment of amounts over $250,000 with pre‑election funds within 20 days or treat the excess as contributions.
- Cruz’s committee repaid only $250,000 after the 20‑day window closed, leaving $10,000 unpaid; Cruz and the Committee sued, alleging §304 violates the First Amendment and challenging the FEC regulation.
- A three‑judge District Court granted summary judgment for Cruz, holding the loan‑repayment cap burdens core political speech without adequate justification and dismissed regulatory claims as moot.
- The Supreme Court held that Cruz and the Committee have Article III standing to challenge the threatened enforcement of §304 and affirmed the District Court’s judgment that §304 burdens core political speech and is not justified by anticorruption interests.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Article III standing — traceability of injury | Cruz: inability to recover $10,000 is injury traceable to threatened enforcement of §304/regulation | Government: injury self‑inflicted; caused by appellees' choices or by FEC regulation, not statute | Court: standing exists; voluntary exposure to statute does not defeat traceability; agency rule enforcement is traceable to statute |
| Standing to challenge statute (vs regulation) | Cruz: may challenge §304 because the FEC rule implements and cannot operate independently of the statute | Government: injury stems from regulation (§116.11), not §304, so plaintiffs lack jurisdiction to challenge statute in three‑judge court | Court: plaintiffs can challenge §304 because the regulation implements §304 and would fall if statute invalidated; three‑judge jurisdiction proper |
| Whether §304 burdens First Amendment speech | Cruz: cap increases risk loans won’t be repaid and deters candidate loans, burdening core political speech (esp. challengers/new candidates) | Government: burden is minor; statute regulates contributions not expenditures and candidate can still self‑fund | Court: §304 burdens core political speech by deterring candidate loans and raising barrier to entry |
| Whether §304 is justified by anti‑corruption interest | Cruz: Government lacks record evidence of quid pro quo corruption tied to post‑election loan repayment; existing contribution limits and disclosure undercut necessity | Government: post‑election repayments create heightened quid pro quo risk or appearance; Congress's judgment deserves deference | Court: Government failed to show §304 advances permissible anticorruption interest; evidence is speculative and insufficient; statute not justified |
Key Cases Cited
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555 (standing elements: injury, traceability, redressability)
- Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U. S. 202 (willingly incurred injury does not defeat standing)
- Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U. S. 398 (limits on manufactured standing where future injury speculative)
- Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 (distinction between expenditure and contribution regulations; protection for personal campaign expenditures)
- McCutcheon v. Federal Election Comm'n, 572 U. S. 185 (only anti‑corruption or its appearance justifies contribution limits; government bears burden of justification)
- Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U. S. 149 (pre‑enforcement standing principles)
- Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490 (standing does not depend on merits of claim)
- Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U. S. 363 (testers suffer cognizable injuries for standing purposes)
- Collins v. Yellen, 594 U. S. _ (a plaintiff may challenge a statute when an agency acts under statutory authority; agency action traceable to statute)