778 F. Supp. 2d 1123
D.N.M.2011Background
- FDIC is plaintiff; Harger, Rocky Mountain Plumbing & Heating, Springer Construction, and the Chapter 7 Trustee are defendants in a 1989 foreclosure action on Valencia County property.
- Stipulated Order and Default Judgment foreclosed FDIC's and Springer's interests, with a one-year redemption period and a provision that deficiencies could be pursued in bankruptcy court.
- Special master Julie Gregory was appointed under the Stipulated Order to oversee notice and sale, but no foreclosure sale occurred.
- Contamination of the property and a NM environment response led to delays; 103B later acquired title via quitclaim deed, and a state quiet title action ensued.
- In 2006 the Valencia County state court entered Default Judgment declaring FDIC’s rights time-barred and extinguishing FDIC’s interest; Bazen later sought to substitute into this federal case, asserting FDIC assigned its rights.
- The court subsequently vacated its prior MOO, held no jurisdiction to review the state court default judgment, and denied 103B’s intervention and other relief.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the court should substitute the special master named in the Stipulated Order | Bazen seeks substitution as Plaintiff with FDIC’s rights. | 103B opposes, arguing for intervention and enforcement of FDIC’s rights. | Court vacates prior stance; no substitution pursued. |
| Whether 103B may intervene in the federal case | 103B has legitimate interest in the Property against Bazen's claims. | Bazen’s claims render intervention inappropriate and unnecessary for this court. | Denied; 103B not permitted to intervene. |
| Whether the court should vacate its March 30, 2011 MOO | New adversarial information warrants reconsideration. | N/A or other party arguments not stated. | Court vacates MOO. |
| Whether the court has jurisdiction to review the state court Default Judgment | N/A | Bazen seeks voiding of the state court judgment. | Court lacks jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman to review or void state court judgment. |
| Whether the FDIC’s rights under the Stipulated Order are viable post-state court judgment | FDIC’s interests may be enforceable under the Stipulated Order. | State court judgment extinguished FDIC’s interests. | No relief; court lacks jurisdiction and vacates prior positions. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bolden v. City of Topeka, Kan., 441 F.3d 1129 (10th Cir. 2006) (Rooker-Feldman applies to state-court judgments and related claims)
- Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (Supreme Court 2005) (preclusion; limits of federal review of state court judgments)
- Erlandson v. Northglenn Mun. Court, 528 F.3d 785 (10th Cir. 2008) (Rooker-Feldman jurisdictional limits; not reviewable state judgments)
- Ajiwoju v. Housing Authority of Kansas City, 173 F.3d 863 (10th Cir. 1999) (Rooker-Feldman posture in parallel state proceedings)
- Golden v. Helen Sigman & Associates, Ltd., 611 F.3d 356 (7th Cir. 2010) (limits of Rooker-Feldman in state-federal litigation posture)
- Matlock v. Somerford, 328 P.2d 600 (N.M. 1958) (attempted collateral attack on foreclosure judgments)