Featherston v. District of Columbia Superior Court
910 F. Supp. 2d 1
D.D.C.2012Background
- Featherston, a former Superior Court employee, alleges disability discrimination under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act after bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome; she also claims workers’ compensation and public policy wrongful termination claims.
- Defendant DC Courts system allegedly terminated or failed to accommodate Featherston’s disability, initially providing restricted duty then withdrawing accommodation in December 2004.
- Featherston returned to regular duties in 2005 but alleged ongoing discriminatory conduct until her 2006 termination.
- Plaintiff sought EEOC relief; she submitted an intake questionnaire in 2006 and a formal EEOC charge dated October 20, 2006; the court must assess timeliness and what constitutes the charge.
- District Court granted in part and denied in part; Count III (CMPA compensation) to be removed/amended; Count IV (public policy) dismissed; Count I limited to discrete acts after December 24, 2005; Count II litigation continues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the intake questionnaire constitutes a charge | Featherston argues the intake questionnaire is the EEOC charge. | DC argues the formal charge constitutes the charge and the intake form is not a charge. | Intake questionnaire does not constitute the charge; formal charge governs. |
| Timeliness of ADA claims based on discrete acts | Featherston contends some discrete acts timely as related to the charge. | DC argues all discrete acts outside 300-day window are time-barred. | Claims based on discrete acts before 12/24/2005 are time-barred; those on/after are timely. |
| Whether Count II (Rehabilitation Act) is timely and viable | Relies on previously rejected timing arguments; claims are timely in earlier rulings. | Argues Rehabilitation Act claims untimely. | Count II remains; court has previously rejected the argument and will deny summary judgment in whole. |
| Whether Count III (CMPA-based compensation) should be dismissed or removed | Claims CMPA applies to Featherston’s position; seeks compensation. | CMPA excludes court personnel; case may lack CMPA coverage. | Count III removed by amendment; defendant’s motion as to Count III denied as moot. |
| Whether Count IV (public policy wrongful termination) should be maintained | Advances a public-policy termination claim. | Public policy claim unsupported under at-will doctrine; no protected activity pled. | Count IV dismissed for failure to plead protected activity and causal connection. |
Key Cases Cited
- Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (Holowecki standard for intake questionnaires as charges)
- Beckham v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 590 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D.D.C. 2008) (intake language and purpose affecting charge status)
- Hodge v. United Airlines, 666 F. Supp. 2d 14 (D.D.C. 2009) (application of Holowecki/Holowecki-like analyses to determine when a questionnaire serves as a charge)