FBI v. Fikre, 601 U.S. 234

Yonas Fikre, a U.S. citizen, alleged he was unlawfully placed on the No Fly List by the government after refusing to act as an informant regarding his religious community.
Fikre claimed the FBI interrogated him in Sudan about his mosque and conditioned removal from the List on his cooperation; after refusing, he was detained in the UAE at the FBI’s behest, then lived in Sweden, unable to return to the U.S.
Fikre’s suit asserted violations of procedural due process and claimed discriminatory reasons (race, national origin, religion) underlay his listing.
In 2016, the government removed Fikre from the No Fly List and sought to dismiss the case as moot.
Both the district court and Ninth Circuit considered if administrative delisting rendered Fikre’s claims moot; the Ninth Circuit twice reversed district court dismissals, finding the government’s assurances insufficient.
The Supreme Court reviewed whether the government's delisting sufficed to moot the dispute, especially under the voluntary cessation doctrine.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Mootness by Voluntary Cessation	Removal from the List does not guarantee conduct will not recur; no assurance against relisting for the same reasons.	Administrative removal and government declaration stating Fikre will not be relisted based on current info is sufficient.	Not moot; government has not met burden to show challenged conduct cannot reasonably recur.
Necessity of Detailed Disclosure for Mootness	No meaningful notice or info about basis for placement/removal; due process lacking.	No requirement to disclose classified reasons for listing/removal to prove mootness.	Repudiation not required; focus is on future, not disclosure of past conduct.
Impact of Time Elapsed Since Delisting	Time does not mitigate the risk of recurrence if relisting criteria unclear/discriminatory.	Years since delisting suggest recurrence is unlikely; presumes Fikre has engaged in same conduct since removal.	Time alone and speculation about Fikre’s conduct do not satisfy government’s burden.
Standard for Mootness in Government Action	High burden: must show challenged conduct cannot reasonably recur.	Government seeks more lenient standard for its own voluntary cessation.	Standard applies equally to government and private actors.

United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321 (clarifies syllabus is not part of the opinion)
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (federal courts' duty to resolve cases properly before them)
Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85 (voluntary cessation does not automatically moot a case)
Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1 (courts cannot pronounce on past actions with no continuing effect)
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (defendant must show challenged conduct cannot reasonably recur)
United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (reasonable expectation of recurrence prevents mootness)
Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U.S. 449 (voluntary cessation standard applies to government)
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (declined mootness years after voluntary cessation)
City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (same issue: challenged conduct could recur)
County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (repudiation of past conduct not required to prove mootness)
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216 (burden to prove mootness remains with government)