Faust v. State
491 S.W.3d 733
| Tex. Crim. App. | 2015Background
- At a Fort Worth gay pride parade, members of Kingdom Baptist Church (including appellants Faust and Marroquin) protested; police established a temporary skirmish line to separate the church group from parade participants based on a history of confrontations.
- Officers told appellants they could move in any direction except southbound past the skirmish line; appellants attempted to cross and were arrested for violating Texas Penal Code § 38.15(a)(1) (Interference with Public Duties).
- Trial court convicted both after a consolidated bench trial; appellants argued the skirmish line unlawfully suppressed their First Amendment rights (an "as-applied" challenge).
- The Second Court of Appeals reversed, holding the police line was not narrowly tailored and impermissibly targeted the church based on past speech-related disturbances.
- The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review and reversed the court of appeals, holding the skirmish line was a lawful, content-neutral time/place/manner restriction and § 38.15(a)(1) was properly applied.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Faust/Marroquin) | Defendant's Argument (State/Police) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Whether the police skirmish line violated appellants’ First Amendment rights such that application of § 38.15(a)(1) was unconstitutional | The skirmish line was a content- and viewpoint-based prior restraint preventing appellants from reaching parade-goers; banning church members based on affiliation and past incidents was overly broad | The line was content neutral, aimed at preventing violence and preserving the peace, not suppressing viewpoint; arrests were for disobeying lawful police orders and interfering with duties | Court: Skirmish line lawful; restriction met time/place/manner test; § 38.15(a)(1) validly applied (convictions reinstated) |
| 2) If content-neutral, whether the restriction was narrowly tailored and left ample alternatives | The line was broader than necessary (barred all church members though others passed) and not the least restrictive means | Police had significant interest in public safety given history; temporary separation was directly effective and not required to be least restrictive alternative | Court: Narrow tailoring requirement satisfied (need not be least restrictive); ample alternative channels remained (other directions available) |
| 3) Whether appellants had a right to disobey police orders they believed violated their constitutional rights | Appellants argued they could not be criminally punished for resisting an order that unlawfully suppressed speech | State argued citizens may not ignore lawful police orders; § 38.15 criminalizes interference with officers performing duties and provides limited defense for speech-only conduct | Court: Because the skirmish line was lawful, appellants had no right to disobey; convictions stand. Concurring opinions discuss narrow circumstances for resisting unlawful police action and civil remedies under § 1983 |
| 4) Preservation and procedural posture: whether appellants preserved the as-applied First Amendment claim | Appellants challenged the skirmish line at trial and sought judgment of acquittal based on unconstitutional application | State argued trial record preserved; dissent urged remand for sufficiency/preservation analysis | Court: Found as-applied challenge preserved and addressed merits; one dissent urged remand to resolve preservation/sufficiency issues first |
Key Cases Cited
- Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (time/place/manner principles for residential picketing)
- Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (public forum doctrine, categories of public fora)
- Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral time/place/manner regulations)
- Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (more searching scrutiny for injunction-type speech restrictions)
- Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting-words doctrine; some speech unprotected)
- Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (limits of protection for certain abusive appeals to hostility)
- Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (police may act to prevent imminent breach of the peace)
- Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (invalidating decisions that allow unfettered discretion to suppress peaceful demonstrations)
- Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951) (striking ordinance granting unbounded permit discretion for public speaking)
- Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (upholding content-neutral restrictions near healthcare facilities)
- City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (secondary-effects doctrine in content-neutral regulation)
- Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969) (protecting peaceful demonstrators from punishment where conduct was not disorderly)
- Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (time/place/manner regulations and forum analysis)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (use-of-force standards; officers authorized some physical coercion in performance of duties)