227 A.3d 584
Md.2020Background
- In January 1987 Adeline Wilford was murdered; latent palm prints were lifted from a propped utility-room window exterior and the washing machine inside the utility room.
- In 1991–92 a confidential informant reported William Thomas confessed to the burglary/murder and named Ty Brooks as an accomplice, but MSP did not check the scene prints against Thomas or Ty Brooks at that time.
- In 2000 Beverly Haddaway identified Jonathan Smith, David Faulkner, and Ray Andrews; Smith and Faulkner were tried separately in 2001, convicted of burglary and felony murder, and sentenced to life.
- In 2013 automated palm-print searches (MAFIS) matched the utility-room and washing-machine prints to Ty Brooks; recorded pretrial conversations later produced showed Haddaway threatened to alter testimony unless the State dismissed drug charges against her grandson, which the State did shortly before trial.
- Smith and Faulkner filed petitions for writs of actual innocence under CP § 8-301 based on (1) the Ty Brooks palm-print match, (2) the Haddaway–Bollinger recordings, and (3) Danny Keene’s statement about a car at the house; the circuit court denied relief, the intermediate court remanded, and the Court of Appeals reversed and ordered new trials.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a trial court must assess newly discovered items cumulatively when evaluating CP § 8-301 materiality | Faulkner/Smith: court must assess cumulative effect of all newly discovered evidence (palm print + recordings + other items) | State: cumulative analysis appropriate but circuit court did perform one | Court: cumulative analysis is required; circuit court did consider cumulative effect but committed other legal errors |
| Proper legal standard for materiality under § 8-301 (standard of proof regarding alternate perpetrators) | Plaintiffs: need only show a "substantial or significant possibility" the verdict would differ, not prove alternate perpetrators beyond a reasonable doubt | State: lower court treated evidence skeptically and emphasized inconsistencies; court occasionally framed inquiry in terms of convincing jurors beyond a reasonable doubt | Court: circuit court applied an incorrect, overly demanding standard (effectively requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to alternate perpetrators); correct inquiry is whether the new evidence creates a substantial or significant possibility of a different result |
| Materiality of the Ty Brooks palm-print match (alternate-perpetrator evidence) | Plaintiffs: undisputed MAFIS match to Ty Brooks, Ty Brooks had burglary history and lied about presence; corroborated by Thomas’s earlier confession to James Brooks — cumulatively can generate reasonable doubt | State: trial evidence (witnesses, confessions) and inconsistencies in James Brooks’s account undercut the import of the palm-print match | Court: palm-print match plus Thomas’s preexisting confession and related facts create a substantial or significant possibility juries would have reached different results; circuit court erred in discounting the alternate-perpetrator evidence |
| Brady suppression / materiality of Haddaway–Bollinger recordings (deal to dismiss grandson’s charges & other irregularities) | Plaintiffs: recordings show secret deal and inducements, would materially impeach Haddaway and affect jury view of prosecution integrity; cumulative with palm-print evidence warrants new trials | State: recordings do not contradict core trial testimony and impeachment was largely cumulative | Court: recordings were materially impeaching, not merely cumulative; they show significant irregularities (secret deal, access to discovery, recruiting informants) that would likely have altered juror assessment and, cumulatively with palm-print evidence, warrant new trials |
Key Cases Cited
- Wilson v. State, 363 Md. 333 (1999) (Brady materiality evaluated collectively; suppressed evidence assessed cumulatively)
- Bowers v. State, 320 Md. 416 (1990) (cumulative effect of multiple errors/evidence relevant to reversal in ineffective-assistance context)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (Brady materiality assessed in context of the whole record)
- McGhie v. State, 449 Md. 494 (2016) (explaining "substantial or significant possibility" standard)
- Yonga v. State, 221 Md. App. 45 (2015) (actual-innocence materiality framework discussion)
- Jackson v. Sollie, 449 Md. 165 (2016) (trial court must exercise discretion according to correct legal standards)
- Wilson-X v. Dep’t of Human Res., 403 Md. 667 (2008) (trial judges may not apply incorrect legal standards)
- Harrington v. Iowa, 659 N.W.2d 509 (Iowa 2003) (alternate-suspect evidence can be material even if it does not prove third party guilty beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Gray v. State, 368 Md. 529 (2002) (jury may draw adverse inference from witness invoking Fifth Amendment)
- Smallwood v. State, 451 Md. 290 (2017) (threshold showing that petitioner may be actually innocent required under § 8-301)