Faulk v. Union Pacific Railroad
172 So. 3d 1034
La.2015Background
- Union Pacific possessed a right of use servitude over land in Ouachita Parish via historic Deeds to Right of Way; landowners retained ownership beneath the tracks.
- Crossings existed historically, with several private crossings maintained for landowners’ farming operations and access.
- Louisiana enacted LSA-R.S. 48:394 in 2008 to require advance notice, hearings, and regulatory review by the LPSC before closing private crossings.
- The statute directs the LPSC to determine whether a crossing unreasonably burdens or substantially interferes with rail transportation and to order closure accordingly.
- Union Pacific challenged the statute as applied, arguing it effectuates an unconstitutional taking or otherwise impairs its rights; the district court partly granted relief to plaintiffs, and the Fifth Circuit certified questions to the Louisiana Supreme Court on constitutional takings grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether LSA-R.S. 48:394, as applied, effects an unconstitutional taking under Art. I, § 4 of the Louisiana Constitution. | Union Pacific contends the statute burdened its use rights and amounts to a taking. | Louisiana asserts the statute is a valid police-power, procedural measure that regulates access without transferring ownership. | No unconstitutional taking as applied. |
| Whether Union Pacific has standing to challenge the statute given its rights are servitudes, not ownership. | Union Pacific claims a real-right status supports standing. | Oil/railroad servitudes confer sufficient standing; ownership remains with landowners. | Standing established by servitude rights. |
| Whether LSA-R.S. 48:394 is retroactive as to existing disputes and whether retroactivity is constitutional. | Retroactive application injures vested property and contracts. | Statute is procedural/retroactive by remedial design and does not disturb vested rights. | Statute deemed procedural and retroactive applicable. |
| Whether the statute is a permissible regulatory framework balancing federal preemption and state police power, and whether any taking occurs under ripeness principles (Williamson/Palazzolo considerations). | Regulatory process diverts property use without just compensation. | Regulation provides notice/hearing and preempts only when required by federal law; not a taking absent final agency determination. | Regulation permissible; no regulatory taking ripe until LPSC acts. |
Key Cases Cited
- Faulk v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 576 Fed.Appx. 345 (5th Cir.2014) (certified question on takings under Louisiana law)
- Avenal v. State, 886 So.2d 1085 (La.2004) (three-prong framework for eminent domain analysis)
- Chambers Investment Co. v. Dept. of Transportation & Development, 595 So.2d 598 (La.1992) (three-prong takings inquiry; public purpose)
- Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (regulatory takings principles; compensation when action is tantamount to appropriation)
- Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (ripeness; final agency action required for taking claim)
- Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (ripeness and advancement of regulatory takings claim)
- Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (per se permanent physical taking)
- Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Environmental Protection, 560 U.S. 702 (2010) (takings jurisprudence guidance)