Farzan v. Bridgewater Associates, LP
699 F. App'x 57
| 2d Cir. | 2017Background
- Plaintiff Raymond Farzan sued former employers (Bridgewater et al.) asserting breach of an employment contract, state and federal discrimination claims, and an obstruction-of-justice claim; case was removed to federal court.
- District court stayed discovery pending defendants’ pre-answer motions to dismiss.
- District court dismissed breach and obstruction claims for failure to state a claim and dismissed discrimination claims as time barred.
- Farzan appealed the discovery stay, the dismissal of the breach claim (contract interpretation), the obstruction claim, and the timeliness dismissal of discrimination claims.
- The Second Circuit considered de novo Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals and abuse-of-discretion review for discovery rulings, and affirmed the district court in all respects.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether district court abused discretion by staying discovery pending motions to dismiss | Stay was improper; discovery should proceed | Court had discretion and could stay discovery pending resolution of dispositive motions | No abuse of discretion; stay was appropriate given plaintiff’s litigation history and low likelihood of surviving motions to dismiss |
| Whether recruiter’s statement created an enforceable term contrary to an at-will termination clause | Farzan argued recruiter told him he would work at least 18 months, so contract was not at-will | Employment agreement expressly permitted termination on two weeks’ notice; contractual language controls | Dismissal affirmed: clear, unambiguous at-will clause governs; recruiter’s alleged statement cannot vary written term |
| Whether plaintiff stated a private cause of action for obstruction of justice based on interference with CHRO investigation | Farzan asserted defendants obstructed CHRO investigation and thus obstructed justice | Obstruction of justice is a criminal offense, not a private civil cause of action | Claim dismissed: obstruction is criminal, not a private right of action |
| Whether discrimination claims were time barred and whether federal Rule 3 controls service timing for state claims | Farzan argued Rule 3 (commencement by filing) should govern timeliness, making his claims timely | Defendants relied on Connecticut law requiring service within 90 days of CHRO release; federal courts must apply state service rules for state-law claims; Farzan conceded EEOC claims served late | Claims are time barred: federal discrimination claims conceded untimely; state claims governed by Connecticut 90-day rule (Walker v. Armco) and were not served within that period |
Key Cases Cited
- Wills v. Amerada Hess Corp., 379 F.3d 32 (2d Cir. 2004) (district courts have broad discretion over pretrial discovery)
- Biro v. Conde Nast, 807 F.3d 541 (2d Cir. 2015) (12(b)(6) review standard)
- Schilberg Integrated Metals Corp. v. Continental Cas. Co., 263 Conn. 245 (Conn. 2003) (clear contract terms control interpretation)
- Associated Catalog Merchandisers, Inc. v. Chagnon, 210 Conn. 734 (Conn. 1989) (parol evidence/courts’ approach to written agreements)
- Holowecki v. Federal Express Corp., 440 F.3d 558 (2d Cir. 2006) (timeliness/dismissal review principles)
- Johnson v. AL Tech Specialties Steel Corp., 731 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1984) (12(b)(6) and related timeliness standards)
- Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (U.S. 1980) (federal courts must apply state rules governing service for state-law claims)
- Converse v. General Motors Corp., 893 F.2d 513 (2d Cir. 1990) (applying Walker to Connecticut law)
- Francis v. Elmsford Sch. Dist., 442 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2006) (plaintiff concession of untimely EEOC/right-to-sue receipt bars federal discrimination claim)